CYBER-NUISANCE
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ABSTRACT
2020, the year of the unprecedented SolarWinds hack, saw statesponsored cyber-agents taking near-war tensions between the U.S.
and Iran to a computer near you; inevitably, cyber-criminals are
likely to exploit the ensuing chaos to hack, steal, and ransom with
impunity. As it stands, the dominant cyberlaw paradigm as
expressed in the 2017 NATO-led Tallinn Manual 2.0 has no realistic
means to respond to or prevent these scenarios: it is stuck choosing
between escalating cyber-reprisals on the one hand (sometimes
conveniently or falsely attributing criminal cyber-conduct to state
agents to justify a response) and paralysis to avoid such escalation
on the other.
This Article submits that the cyberlaw paradigm is stuck in a
false dichotomy—and that this false dichotomy can only be resolved
if we gain a better understanding of the legal nature of cyberspace
itself. The Article is the first to establish that cyberspace as a matter
of property law consists of a global web of correlative rights
protected by means of a general nuisance principle. The Article uses
a functional comparative property and natural-resource law
analysis to prove the existence of such a general nuisance principle
premised upon the idea of correlative rights. It demonstrates that
this principle is applicable to cyberspace and is in fact consistent
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with many of the existing starting points of cyberlaw. But it maps
further how and where the Tallinn 2.0 paradigm went demonstrably
astray—and more importantly, how the cyberlaw-paradigm can
now be set right. Centrally, Cyber-Nuisance develops (1) how states
and apex non-state actors (Windows, Apple, Facebook, Twitter,
Google, and the like) share in governance obligations; (2) what the
overarching goal of these governance obligations is—the protection
of connectivity of cyberspace participants; and (3) an abatementbased enforcement mechanism that escapes the escalation trap
bedeviling the Tallinn 2.0 approach.
The Article meaningfully advances the literature by providing a
more precise legal framework for understanding the nature of
cyberspace and the obligation of state and non-state actors alike to
protect it. This framework can explain an intuitive insight about
cyberspace that so far has escaped cyberlaw paradigms—namely,
that cyberspace is at once a local and a global domain giving rise to
local and global rights and obligations. The Article does so in a
noticeable departure from dominant cyberlaw frameworks by
grounding the analysis of cyberspace in comparative property law.
It uses this lens to explain how the apparently contradictory local
and global aspects of cyber are but flipsides of how one approaches
correlative rights in their new, virtual context.
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INTRODUCTION

Many great cultures have a common utopian myth: somehow
technology can overcome our limitations, somehow human
ingenuity can unite mankind, somehow technology can make us
masters of our universe. The Middle East had Babel and its tower. 1
Plato and the Greeks had Atlantis.2 China arguably combines
elements of both.3
When they write the story of our civilization, it is not difficult to
guess what will take the place of our tower of Babel, our Atlantis,
our attempt to unite mankind and, to put it in terms of the old
myths, rival the act of creation through human ingenuity:
cyberspace. Cyberspace is the dream of a united humanity
outgrowing crude national competition.4 Cyberspace is the creation
of a new virtual reality to supplant the shortcomings of the
physical—to allow us to connect across global divides and harness
technological power to command our environment.5
But any student of ancient history—or casual fan of adventure
movies—knows how the story ends. The tower crumbles.6 The city
sinks.7 Civilizations fall into deep division.8 The ambition to build
a utopia is swallowed up in a wave of water or dust. A combination
of arrogance or hubris, divine fury or natural disaster, cast them
down.9
1
Genesis 11:1-9; Brent A. Strawn, Holes in the Tower of Babel, OXFORD BIBLICAL
STUD.
ONLINE,
https://global.oup.com/obso/focus/focus_on_towerbabel/
[https://perma.cc/AJ2S-CX4N] (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
2
Plato, Critias, in PLATO, THE COMPLETE WORKS 1292, 1306 (John M. Cooper
ed., 1997); Mark Cartwright, Atlantis, ANCIENT HIS. ENCYCL. (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://www.ancient.eu/atlantis/ [https://perma.cc/4RQZ-WLW7] (providing a
fuller introduction to the reception of the Atlantis myth).
3 See Ricardo Lewis, Does Chinese Civilization Come From Ancient Egypt?, FOR.
POL’Y (Sept. 2, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/02/did-chinesecivilization-come-from-ancient-egypt-archeological-debate-at-heart-of-chinanational-identity/ [https://perma.cc/U4WC-5R27] (discussing interpretations of
the Records of the Grand Historian linking China to an Egyptian origin story).
4
See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
[https://perma.cc/ZHT2-GLMG].
5
See id.
6
Genesis 11:9, supra note 1.
7
Cartwright, supra note 2.
8
Strawn, supra note 1.
9
Strawn, supra note 1; PLATO, supra note 2, at 1306.
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When one looks at the state of cyberattacks today it is not hard
to think that our sky, too, is falling. The tools we hoped would bring
us together around visions of a shared humanity have amplified our
means and appetite to dehumanize even our closest neighbors.10
And the tools we hoped would make our lives better and easier have
instead become the means to rob us,11 imperil our critical
infrastructure,12 surveil and potentially blackmail us,13 and even
turn household items into weapons against us.14
Not only that, but the tools we had hoped would take us beyond
the nation state have become some of its most potent weapons.

10 Jon Keegan, Blue Feed, Red Feed: See Liberal Facebook and Conservative Facebook,
Side by Side, WALL STR. J. (Aug. 19, 2019), http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-redfeed/ [https://perma.cc/23DC-WK7J].
11
Hugh Son, Jamie Dimon’s worst fears for the banking industry realized with
Capital One data hack, CNBC (July 30, 2019, 2:59 PM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/jamie-dimons-worst-fears-for-banksrealized-with-capital-one-hack.html [https://perma.cc/Y6MM-U958].
12
Nicole Perlroth & Scott Shane, In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A. Tool
Wreaks
Havoc,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-hacking-tool-baltimore.html
[https://perma.cc/LW57-W6C9].
13
Neil Vigdor, Somebody’s Watching: Hackers Breach Ring Home Security
Cameras,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
11,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/15/us/Hacked-ring-home-securitycameras.html [https://perma.cc/5Q99-9LT8]; Jack Schofield, I got a phishing email
that tried to blackmail me—what should I do?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2019, 3:00 PM EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2019/jan/17/phishingemail-blackmail-sextortion-webcam [https://perma.cc/WVV3-6ZPZ].
14
Lily Hay Newman, Hackers Can Turn Everyday Speakers Into Acoustic
Cyberweapons,
WIRED
(Aug.
11,
2019,
5:07
PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/acoustic-cyberweapons-defcon/
[https://perma.cc/YVR6-6T2Y].
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States use cyber operations to spy, 15 sabotage,16 and threaten.17 They
can use cyber operations to influence behavior.18 And they use cyber
operations to attack the foundations of democratic civil society.19
Given the SolarWinds attack on U.S. governmental cyber resources,
the recent hacks of Covid-19 vaccine research, as well as the recent
confrontation between the U.S. and Iran, it is only likely to spur
States’ efforts to step up such operations rather than to abandon
them.20
15
Targeting of Visma, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. https://www.cfr.org/cyberoperations/targeting-visma [https://perma.cc/54K4-VM9P] (last visited Mar. 7,
2021); Lindsey O’Donnell, North Korean Spear-Phishing Attack Targets U.S. Firms,
THREATPOST.COM (Sept. 13, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://threatpost.com/north-koreanspear-phishing-attack-us/148299/ [https://perma.cc/XR66-DA2Y]; Christopher
Bing, Jack Stubbs & Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Western intelligence hacked ‘Russia’s
Google’ Yandex to spy on accounts—sources, REUTERS (June 27, 2019, 2:21 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-yandex-exclusive/exclusivewestern-intelligence-hacked-russias-google-yandex-to-spy-on-accounts-sourcesidUSKCN1TS2SX [https://perma.cc/84JA-5EQQ].
16
Andy Greenberg, A Notorious Iranian Hacking Crew Is Targeting Industrial
Control
Systems,
WIRED
(Nov.
20,
2019,
7:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33-industrial-control-systems/
[https://perma.cc/9ZQ7-6VHR].
17
Lily Hay Newman, Russian Hackers Haven’t Stopped Probing the US Power
Grid, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/russianhackers-us-power-grid-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/9WBC-MXG9].
18 See Paris Martineau, The WIRED Guide to Influencers: Everything you need to
know about engagement, power likes, sponcon, and trust, WIRED (Dec. 6, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-aninfluencer/?itm_campaign=BottomRelatedStories_Sections_1
[https://perma.cc/5CPP-FVPJ] (discussing the influencer phenomenon generally).
19 The Most Dangerous People on the Internet This Decade, WIRED (Dec. 31, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/most-dangerous-people-on-internetthis-decade/ [https://perma.cc/F7XM-UFU8].
20
David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth & Julian E. Barnes, As Understanding of
Russian Hacking Grows, So Does Alarm, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/02/us/politics/russian-hackinggovernment.html?searchResultPosition=2
[https://perma.cc/M3SL-R5NV];
Naomi Kresge & Daniele Lepido, Cyber Attackers Leaked Covid-19 Vaccine Data After
EU
Hack,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
12,
2021,
1:20
PM
EST),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-12/covid-vaccinedocuments-leaked-on-web-eu-drug-regulator-says
[https://perma.cc/N8B2LXQV]; Zack Doffman, Cyber Warfare Threat Rises As Iran And China Agree ‘United
Front’
Against
U.S.,
FORBES
(July
6,
2019,
3:19
AM
EDT),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/06/iranian-cyber-threatheightened-by-chinas-support-for-its-cyber-war-on-u-s/#f399adf42ebd
[https://perma.cc/6TPH-2N2K]; Matthew Vann, 2020 campaigns ‘under-prepared’ to
combat foreign cyberattacks: Experts, ABC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2019, 5:56 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/2020-campaigns-prepared-combat-foreign-
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In this environment, it is tempting to look to paradigms of cyber
security to keep the powers we unleashed at bay. Russian, Chinese,
and Iranian proposals dream of radically decoupling the internet
from a global cyberspace.21 The dominant paradigm for cyber
governance is a less radical form of such a security approach to
cyberspace as a whole. It is built upon a paradigm of cyber
responsibility enforced by carefully calibrated, quasi-military cyber
deterrence.22 Careful not to over-threaten, it sets a high cyberresponsibility threshold to eliminate or at the very least limit cyber
reprisals.23 Much like the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian proposals,
it scraps the utopias of a new technological common cyberspace
belonging to all humankind.24 Instead, it is premised upon an
imposition of order and State-power to seek to control the cyber
domain.25
It should not come as a surprise that, from a governance
perspective at least, such efforts will always be second best. The
carefully constructed deterrence posture is designed to keep the
cyber peace between States. It also waters down any meaningful
obligation to actually govern, make safe, and improve cyberspace
for its users.
If one were to impose such a responsibility on States, it would be
easy for hackers (whether State-sponsored or not) to target their
attacks so as to make it appear that a State’s violation of its cyberresponsibility permitted a cyberattack on another State’s
infrastructure. The dominant paradigm seeks to avoid precisely this
scenario.26 As leading experts warn, increased calls for greater
responsibility are likely to lead to greater disruption, not greater
cyberattacks-experts/story?id=67138383 [https://perma.cc/7QAH-8HGW]; Zolan
Kanno-Youngs & Nicole Perlroth, Iran’s Military Response May Be ‘Concluded,’ but
Cyberwarfare
Threat
Grows,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
14,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/us/politics/iran-attack-cyber.html
[https://perma.cc/39UH-64ZR].
21
Justin Sherman, Russia and Iran Plan to Fundamentally Isolate the Internet,
WIRED (June 6, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russia-and-iranplan-to-fundamentally-isolate-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/WMY6-WNQX].
22
INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE NATO COOP. CYBER DEF.
CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE
TO CYBER OPERATIONS 84 r. 14 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) (“TALLINN 2.0”)
(citations to Tallinn 2.0 are to page, rule (r.) and comment paragraph (¶)).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 11 r. 1 ¶ 5.
25
Id.
26
Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, A Cyber Duty of Diligence: Gentle Civilizer
or Crude Destabilizer?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1555 (2017).
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tranquility.27 But this means that the current paradigm retreats from
much of cyberspace as essentially ungovernable—suggesting that
Russia, Iran, and China may be on to something when they desire
simply to be able to shut it off.28
This leaves the question—is there a better way or are we doomed
to watch our infrastructure crumble, our virtual community sink?
Utopian hopes for good cyber-governance exclusively beyond the
State today appear naïve.29 But dystopian security paradigms
rooted in exclusive State power do not fare any better at conserving
cyberspace.30 Their logic, too, potentially threatens cyberspace’s
very existence and certainly does away with its original promise.31
This Article suggests that there is hope yet for cyber-governance.
This hope begins with a clearer understanding of what cyberspace
is. Drawing on political economy literature, the Article argues that
cyberspace is a commons.32 Particularly, it suggests that cyberspace
can meaningfully be analogized to water rights in the commons
literature. The commons literature explains that what matters is the
sustainable use of water—and the efforts that must be made by all
users to maintain physical infrastructure and limit waste to secure
such sustainable access.33 This Article will submit that the same
logic holds for the sustainable use of the common resource in
cyberspace: its connectivity. To secure this connectivity, all cyberusers must participate in the physical maintenance of cyberinfrastructure and diligently root out destructive use of the cybercommons.
The problem is that as of yet, there is no bridge between the
commons rationale in political economy and a legal understanding
of the cyber-commons. Existing frameworks either apply the wrong
property paradigm or no property paradigm at all to their
Id. at 1558.
See Sherman, supra note 21.
29
See Andy Greenberg, It’s Been 20 Years Since This Man Declared Cyberspace
Independence,
WIRED
(Feb.
8,
2016,
9:58
AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/its-been-20-years-since-this-man-declaredcyberspace-independence/ [https://perma.cc/L3UN-2XW2].
30
See Sherman, supra note 21.
31
See Sherman, supra note 21.
32
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (2015) [hereinafter “OSTROM”]; ELINOR
OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005) [hereinafter “OSTROM
DIVERSITY”]. For an application of Ostrom’s theory to cyberspace governance, see
Scott J. Shackelford, The Law of Cyber Peace, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 29-37 (2017).
33
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 76-80, n. 20.
27

28
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governance model of cyber. The utopian understandings would
place cyberspace beyond property into a completely shared
resource.34 This precisely misunderstands the nature of the
commons outlined in the political economy literature. The security
paradigm reduces cyberspace to exclusive property rights—in other
words, sovereignty.35 This understanding of property rights in the
security paradigm is unsustainable as a matter of property law: not
even Texas oil barons could make such an absolute claim to all
mineral rights they hold in fee simple determinable.36
This Article is the first to develop such a full property law
understanding of cyber-commons to square the circle on the basis of
a functional comparative property law analysis. This analysis shows
that the world’s leading jurisdictions recognize a commons-based
property entitlement between no ownership and full ownership:
correlative rights. Global property laws protect, and thus define,
correlative right by means of a nuisance logic. This nuisance logic
of correlative rights actively protects the commons. It further creates
reservoir communities and serves to enforce sustainable community
standards.
The correlative rights approach escapes traps bedeviling the
dominant security paradigm and cyber-utopias. Unlike the security
paradigm, cyber-nuisance does not enforce the infringement of
correlative rights through potentially spiraling countermeasures.
Rather, the self-help remedy for a nuisance is abatement—the
removal of the nuisance to secure the commons. Hackers seeking to
encourage States to resort to excessive self-help would only
encourage increased efforts at conservation. Rather than a vicious
circle of countermeasure begetting countermeasure, such an
approach would create a virtuous circle of conservation begetting
more conservation. The law allows States to govern up, in the sense
of repairing cyberspace and hardening its defenses. It does not
allow States to govern down by letting even more cyberspace fall into
decay for fear of assuming unwanted responsibility and risk of State
reprisals.
Unlike the utopias, cyber-nuisance would anchor the
responsibility for governance both in State and non-State conduct.
34
See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 518-9 (2003).
35
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 11.
36
See David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property
Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN STATE ENV’T. L. REV. 241, 24546 (2011).
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States have an important role to play precisely because they have
jurisdiction over key parts of cyber-infrastructure and cyber
conduct.37 But a nuisance approach understands that States are not
the only actors with correlative rights or correlative duties. Rather,
cyber-nuisance looks to the conduct of all cyber-participants to set
responsible cyber-community standards to secure sustainable
cyber-community rights. This feature of cyber-nuisance—that it
draws in State and non-State actors as rights-holders and
participants in governance—mirrors that of political economy
literature from which this Article departed.38 It gives flesh to the
theoretical concept of “polycentric governance” underpinning the
political economy literature of the commons by showing how such
community standards become part and parcel of legally cognizable
and legally secure correlative rights.39
This Article is organized in six parts. Part II outlines the
dominant security paradigm premised in cyber responsibility. Part
III outlines the key governance blind spots for this paradigm. Part
IV introduces the concept of cyber as a commons. Part V outlines
how a general principle of cyber-nuisance established on the basis
of comparative property law analysis conceives a cyber-commons in
terms of correlative rights and the protection of these correlative
rights. Part VI then concludes with the key cyber-governance
implications of the cyber-nuisance correlative rights paradigm.
II.

CYBER-RESPONSIBILITY

International cyber governance is a core concern for the
international community.40 In fact, it is probably fair to say that
rather than suffering from a dearth of governance ideas, cyber
suffers the opposite problem: an overabundance of ideas as to how

37
See Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Sovereignty in Cyberspace,
JUSTSECURITY.ORG (May 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55876/defensesovereignty-cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/SS6R-3X2A].
38
OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86.
39
OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86.
40
See The Application of International Law in Cyberspace: State of Play, UN OFF.
DISARMENT AFF. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/theapplication-of-international-law-in-cyberspace-state-of-play/
[https://perma.cc/4ZAK-BUCJ].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/2

2021]

Cyber-Nuisance

1015

cyber governance does or should function.41 There are thus many
different candidates of conduct to choose from if one were to ask a
cyber-expert what code governs cyber.
Despite this abundance of different approaches, one approach to
cyber governance should be treated as the first among equals.42 That
governance paradigm is the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallin 2.0).43 Tallinn 2.0 is the result
of an international law study conducted by leading cyber security
experts.44 Tallinn 2.0 codified 154 international law rules on the
conduct of cyber operations.45
The goal of Tallinn 2.0 is to translate the rules governing general
international law to cyber.46 The key matrix according to which
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to achieve this translation is through the lens of
responsibility.47 It translates the general international law of state
responsibility into the cyber realm.48
41
See e.g., LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2021 (2014).
42
See e.g., Molly Sauter, Show Me on the Map Where They Hacked You: Cyberwar
and the Geospatial Internet Doctrine, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 63, 70 (2015)
(submitting that Tallinn Manual is the dominant paradigm in cyber); see also Harold
H. Koh, Keynote Address: The Emerging Law of 21st Century War, 66 EMORY L.J. 487,
504 (2017) (singling out only the Tallinn Manual 2.0 when discussing current cyber
governance instruments); Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf?
Tallinn Manual 2.0 and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 598-652 (2018)
(outlining that States’ practices in response to the Tallinn rules are uneven).
43
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22.
44
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at xxiii-xvix.
45
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at xxiii-xvix.
46
See Phil Spector, In Defense of Sovereignty, in the Wake of Tallinn 2.0, 111 AJIL
UNBOUND 219, 219 (2017-2018) (explaining that the expert authors of which he was
one compiled “the Tallinn translation of international law to the cyber
domain.”(WC:10))
47
See Jensen & Watts, supra note 26 (explaining the link between the Tallinn
2.0 approach and classic state responsibility).
48
Spector, supra note 46, at 219; Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1560. One
key discussion in the literature remains whether cyber is just another new
technology. Thus, “the fact that human beings have developed new technologies
over time, such as trains, cars, telephones, televisions, and mobile phones, does not
mean that these create new ‘domains’ or ‘spaces’ which cannot be subject to existing
legal rules or principles, such as tort or criminal law.” (WC:46) Dapo Akande,
Antonio Coco, & Talita de Souza Dias, Old Habits Die Hard: Applying Existing
International Law in Cyberspace and Beyond, EJIL TALK! (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/old-habits-die-hard-applying-existing-internationallaw-in-cyberspace-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/UQ7Z-L84T]. For the reasons
that will become apparent in this article, cyber poses new problems beyond those
of other new technologies. Translation therefore is more difficult to achieve—even
if the impulse that law remains applicable is certainly apt.
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This focus on responsibility means that Tallinn 2.0 governance
must answer three related questions. First, who is responsible?49
When we speak of “responsibility,” we typically look for a
“culprit”—the person who deserves the blame or sometimes,
though by connotation more rarely, the praise for a certain state of
affairs.50 Second, is what was done wrong or unlawful? 51 This
echoes the synonyms we typically associate with responsibility:
“blame, fault, liability.”52 Third, what can we do about it in a space
without effective courts?53 This links fault with remedies of self-help
known in international law as countermeasures.54
The Tallinn 2.0 experts begin their quest for cyber responsibility
by translating a core principle of general international law to cyber:
the “State bears international responsibility for a cyber related act
that is attributable to the State and that constitutes a breach of an
international legal obligation.”55 To determine if a state is
“responsible”—that is, a culprit—is to translate the international law
governing attribution to cyber.56
In general international law, an action is attributable to the State
in five broad general instances, namely, if the acts are: (1) acts of state
organs (government ministries etc.);57 (2) acts of organs of third
states placed at the disposal of the State;58 (3) acts of persons
empowered by law to exercise governmental authority acting under
color of law;59 (4) acts under the instruction, direction, or control of

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 79-110.
Responsibility,
definition
1.a,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
(2019),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/responsibility
[https://perma.cc/LSR8-3TR7] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
51
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 177-511.
52
Responsibility,
synonyms,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
(2019),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/responsibility
[https://perma.cc/LSR8-3TR7] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
53
TALLINN 2.0, supra note22, at 111-135.
54
See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 97-100 (2006).
55
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 84. Akande, supra note 48Error! Bookmark
not defined. (discussing agreement among different approaches on this point).
56
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 84.
57
Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 40-42 (2001) [hereinafter
“ILC Articles”].
58
Id. at 43-45.
59
Id. at 42-43.
49
50
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the State;60 or (5) acts acknowledged and adopted as their own by
the State.61
In addition to these broad categories, general international law
has special rules governing insurrections and failure of
governmental authority.62
Finally, general international law
provides that it is not a defense to attribution that certain conduct
was in excess of official authority or in contravention to official
instructions.63
Tallinn 2.0 translates these principles in Rule 15 governing cyber
operations by state organs;64 Rule 16 governing cyber operations by
organs of third states placed at the disposal of the State;65 and Rule
17 governing cyber operations by non-State actors.66
The key provision given the problem of tracing cyber conduct to
specific individuals is Rule 17. It collapses ILC Articles 8 and 11 on
State Responsibility into a single rule providing that conduct under
the instruction, direction, or control of the State, as well as conduct
adopted by the State as its own, is attributable.67
Having established what kind of conduct should count as State
conduct, Tallinn 2.0 then sets out to establish rules for what kind of
conduct is impermissible. That is, it tries to codify international
legal prohibitions. These rules run the gamut, from rules governing
special regimes of international law such as human rights,68
diplomatic and consular relations,69 the law of the sea,70 to the
prohibition of intervention in general international law,71 and the
law of armed conflict.72
This leaves the question: what may a State do if it suffers an
injury and the conduct leading to the injury can be attributed to
another State and is internationally wrong? Given the lack of
Id. at 47-49.
Id. at 52-54.
62
Id. at 49-52.
63
Id. at 45-47.
64
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 87.
65
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 93.
66
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 94.
67
Compare TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 94 with ILC Articles, supra note 57, at
47-49, 52-54.
68
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 179-208.
69
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 209-231.
70
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 232-258.
71
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 312-327.
72
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 373-562.
60

61
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international courts of general jurisdiction, this question frequently
boils down to what kind self-help a State may deploy to bring the
wrongdoer to heel.73 In general international law, this question is
governed by the law of countermeasures. Such countermeasures
permit States to suspend the performance of international legal
obligations owed to the wrongdoer until the wrongdoer has stopped
its violation of the State’s international legal rights.74
Countermeasures must be proportionate to the injury suffered.75
Before implementing countermeasures, a State must give the
wrongdoer an opportunity to cease and desist from its wrongful
conduct voluntarily.76 But in any event, the State may not threaten
the use of force or violate fundamental international law norms
including fundamental human rights norms.77
Tallinn 2.0 translates these rules on countermeasures into the
cyber-context. It entitles States to take countermeasures, “whether
cyber in nature or not,” for the violation of an international legal
obligation.78 Consistent with general international law, the purpose
of countermeasures must be to bring about the cessation of wrongful
conduct.79 Tallinn 2.0 stresses that countermeasures may not
“amount to prohibited belligerent reprisal.”80 This links the
discussion of countermeasures to the threshold when a cyberoperation is akin to the use of force.81 This threshold prohibits
operations that in “[their] scale and effects are comparable to noncyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”82 In other
words, it does not matter whether a powerplant explodes because it
is hit by a bomb or malware; this, however, leaves many devastating
cyber operations in play such as “cyber psychological operations
intended solely to undermine confidence in a government.”83
73
See generally Eric Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (John
M. Olin. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2004) (discussing why “the only
international court with general subject matter jurisdiction over international legal
issues” has been utilized less and less frequently over time).
74
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 120, 137.
75
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 134-35.
76
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 135-37.
77
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 131-34.
78
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 111.
79
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 116.
80
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 122-23.
81
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 123.
82
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 330.
83
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 331.
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Finally, Tallinn 2.0 also insists that countermeasures must be
proportionate to the injury suffered but is explicit that it does not
require reciprocity of visiting the same injury on the wrongdoer as
suffered by the State enacting a countermeasure.84
Despite this broad scope of the rules of general international law
translated to cyber, it is possible to crystalize a few general
principles underlying most of them. First, as a general rule, States
may not interfere by cyber means in the affairs of other States or
individuals beyond their territorial boundaries.85 Second, the
principle of proportionality plays a continuing rule in the regulation
of cyber conduct.86 This principle is broadly applicable in the
context of measures taken in response to threats both in the interState sphere and in the human rights context.87 Third, there remains
a strong reserved domain for States to continue to exercise near
absolute authority in organizing their own political system and
organization.88
Perhaps the most controversial and important general duty
contained in Tallinn 2.0 is the duty of diligence.89 This duty requires
that the state protect others against harm from within its borders.90
This duty of diligence, however, does not impose a duty to
monitor.91 Rather, it requires only that the State respond to
circumstances of which it has actual or constructive knowledge.92
The duty is controversial because states, understandably, do not like
obligations of diligence imposed on them, given that it severely
limits their range of action—and their range of plausible
deniability.93

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 127-28.
Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, GEO. J.
INT’L L. 743, 758, 760, 763, 769, 771-72, 775-76 (2017).
86
Id. 754, 761.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 775.
89
Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1566-67; Jensen, supra note 85, at 744-76;
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 30-50.
90
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 43.
91
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 41-42.
92
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 41-42.
93
Efrony & Shany, supra note 42, at 645-55.
84
85
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CRACKS IN THE CODE

a. The Connectivity Blind Spot
Tallinn 2.0 runs into conceptual problems almost from the outset.
The Tallinn-2.0 approach to global cyber law is classically Statebased.94 Tallinn 2.0 codifies international cyber law by translating
general international law rules into the new cyber context.95
International law is the law between sovereigns.96 So international
cyber law must also be exclusively the law governing State
conduct.97
This syllogism—international law is the law between States;
international cyber law is international law; thus, international cyber
law is the law between States governing cyber—holds good in
academic public international law and the law of armed conflict.98 It
is therefore unsurprising that it would hold sway as a foundational
matter for Tallinn 2.0. After all, the experts drafting Tallinn 2.0 were
experts in these fields.99
This syllogism of course does not suggest that all non-State
conduct in cyber is legally irrelevant. Quite to the contrary. It is just
not an issue for international cyber law. It is a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of domestic courts and regulation by domestic law.100

94
See TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17 (conceiving of cyber law around the
premise of violation of sovereignty).
95
Spector, supra note 46, at 219.
96
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1415 (9th ed. 2019); JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 221
(2014)("CRAWFORD 2014”) (“If international law is the law between States (as
historically conceived), and in some sense is derived beyond the control of domestic
constitutional arrangements, by contrast the locus of validity of municipal law is a
matter which is the first and usually the last place of local constitutional ordering.”).
97
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17.
98
See CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 14-15 (general international law governs
relationship between states); GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 189 (2d ed. 2016) (law of armed conflict
governs conflicts between states of a certain kind)
99
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at xii-xviii.
100
CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 440-470; Nori Katagiri, Why International Law
and Norms Do Little in Preventing Non-State Cyber Attacks, 7 J CYBER SEC. (2021),
https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyab009/6168044
[https://perma.cc/BV5H-9HT7].
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Tallinn 2.0 follows traditional international law in treating nonState conduct as an issue subject to domestic regulation.101 Thus,
international cyber law “does not extend to the actions of non-State
actors unless such actions are attributable to a State.”102 It does not
apply to corporate conduct.103 It does not even apply to the conduct
of terrorist groups.104 Tallinn 2.0 is unequivocal on this point.105
Tallinn 2.0 sets out that such non-State conduct is subject to the
ordinary domestic criminal jurisdiction of States themselves.106
Thus a corporation hacking a State would be subject to the criminal
process of its home state.107 Presumably, the corporation would also
be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State at the receiving end
of the hack.108 Tallinn 2.0, in sum, treats non-State conduct as
potentially criminal activity under domestic law and subjects
international cyber-criminal prosecutions to much of the same
strictures as ordinary criminal process.
This approach has a significant conceptual blind spot. Tallinn
2.0 might work if it seamlessly imposed an obligation on the State to
criminalize, monitor, and enforce cyber-crime law in its jurisdiction
and cooperate with other States in the enforcement of their cyber
laws. If that were the case, there would be no need for international
cyber law to reach the conduct of non-State actors in order to
safeguard international cyber governance: the obligation in
international cyber law for domestic law to bear the brunt of cyber
governance and regulation of non-State actors plausibly would fill
the governance gap of a purely State-based paradigm.109
Problematically, Tallinn 2.0 does not follow such an approach.
To the contrary, it is explicit that the diligence principle does not
imply an obligation to take preventive measures to interdict cyber
harm from non-State actors.110 What is more, there is not even an

101

note 48.

See Schmitt, supra note 37. For additional context, see also Akande, supra

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17-18.
104
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 18.
105
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 18.
106
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 51.
107
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17-18
108
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 60-66.
109
For a discussion of such a paradigm, see Frédéric G. Sourgens, The Paris
Paradigm, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1637 (2019).
110
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 44.
102
103
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obligation to monitor cyber activity by non-State actors.111 In short,
Tallinn 2.0 imposes no obligation on States to regulate, monitor, and
enforce cyber conduct on the domestic level.112 Its diligence
obligation only covers the obligation to cease and desist or interdict
future conduct once existing conduct has already caused significant
cross-boundary adverse consequences abroad.113
This threshold was set with an eye towards the availability of
countermeasures.114 A low threshold for diligence obligations
increases the opportunity (or excuse) for significant
countermeasures.115 Given the significant range of available cyber
countermeasures outlined above, this is clearly an undesirable
result.
But from any governance perspective, such a diligence
obligation is too toothless to bite: it permits States to wait for
significant adverse consequences before acting.116 As far as
governance design goes, this has “diligence” backwards. Diligence
is an exercise in understanding risk for significant adverse
consequences before they arise and not after.117 The point of diligence
is to “avoid nasty surprises.”118 The point of governance is to enlist
stakeholders to avoid disaster to the greatest extent possible and
sustainable.119 Diligence is a tool to achieve this end. Tallinn 2.0
diligence, unlike governance, only springs into action once there is
a crisis.
This fundamentally misunderstands the point of
diligence.120
Tallinn 2.0’s understanding of diligence is even more
problematic in the cyber context. This problem can best be
illustrated by way of example. On June 27, 2017, the world suffered
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

(2004).

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 45.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 45.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 43.
Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1563-64.
See Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1563-64.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40.
See LINDA S. SPEDDING, DUE DILIGENCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2

118
Rodrigo Amaral, Due diligence: making sure there are no nasty surprises,
RACONTEUR (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.raconteur.net/finance/due-diligencemaking-sure-there-are-no-nasty-surprises [https://perma.cc/WFQ7-259F].
119
MARK BEVIR, GOVERNANCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1-10 (2012).
120
While diligence also has a role to play in crisis management, this is not its
principal role. Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn, Crisis Prevention and Crisis
Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance 42-48 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 02/163, 2002).
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a devastating cyberattack dubbed “NotPetya.”121
Western
intelligence services believe that Russia deployed NotPetya as a
cyberattack against Ukraine.122 The Russian government steadfastly
denies this charge.123
What is undisputed is that NotPetya spread from Ukraine to
Denmark, the U.S., and India, and resulted in significant damage in
the billions of dollars in all three jurisdictions.124 All NotPetya ever
needed to spread beyond Ukraine was the smallest of footholds in a
single unprotected computer in a company to shut down and destroy
that company’s entire global IT infrastructure and infect other
companies continents away.125 That is what apparently happened
to Danish shipping giant Maersk, shutting down its headquarters in
Copenhagen and much of the shipping on the U.S. Eastern
seaboard.126 Given the scope of the initial attack, this disruption
outside of Ukraine was likely unintended.127
Reacting to events like NotPetya after they strike may well be an
exercise in futility. Once the world notices serious adverse
consequences from a NotPetya event, it is already too late to stop it
or even mitigate the damage.128 Therefore, to be meaningful,
diligence must prevent cyber threats and not merely react to them.
Tallinn 2.0’s State-based approach also suffers from an intuitive
problem, even if it heightened state diligence obligations.
Companies such as Windows, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, or Google
have far greater de facto influence over cyber governance than a State
121
Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating
Cyberattack
in
History,
WIRED
(Aug.
22,
2018,
5:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-codecrashed-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/5ECZ-XMTW].
122
Ellen Nakashima, Russian military was behind NotPetya cyberattack in
Ukraine, CIA concludes, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:46 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-militarywas-behind-notpetya-cyberattack-in-ukraine-ciaconcludes/2018/01/12/048d8506-f7ca-11e7-b34a-b85626af34ef_story.html
[https://perma.cc/DZE3-6ZWB].
123
Rachel England, Russia denies UK claim it was behind NotPetya cyberattack,
ENGADGET (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/02/15/russiadenies-uk-claim-it-was-behind-notpetya-cyberattack/ [https://perma.cc/BV88NRU8]
124
James E. Scheuermann, Cyber Risks, Systemic Risks, and Cyber Insurance, 122
PENN STATE L. REV. 613, 635 (2018).
125
Greenberg, supra note 121.
126
Greenberg, supra note 121.
127
Greenberg, supra note 121.
128
Greenberg, supra note 121.
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such as Nepal.129 Yet, Nepal is captured by the Tallinn 2.0 approach
but Windows, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, and Google are not. 130 This
leaves a significant governance gap in the cyber fabric.131
NotPetya again is a good example for this problem—this time of
the role of non-State actors in cyber governance. NotPetya exploited
a vulnerability in a Windows protocol allowing hackers to run code
remotely on a computer without a patch for the vulnerability.132
Windows was aware of the vulnerability partly due to news reports
advertising an NSA hacking tool exploiting the same
vulnerability.133 As NotPetya began its destructive work, Windows
was working on releasing a patch, but the patch had not yet been
fully implemented worldwide.134 Windows thus is a key player in
any governance discussion in how to avoid another NotPetya, as is
the diligence of critical infrastructure companies in updating
operating systems once they have been notified of a vulnerability.
In other words, to focus only on Russia or only on Ukraine misses
the bigger picture of the role of non-State conduct in cyber safety.
What is more, to understand NotPetya is to understand that
State and non-State conduct connects and interacts on a constant
basis. The NSA was the first to exploit a Windows vulnerability
with its hacking tool EternalBlue.135 Without the U.S. governmentsponsored hacking tool, would NotPetya have happened? Then
there is the question of the hack of the NSA by a hacking collective
known as Shadow Brokers, which began leaking tools including
EternalBlue from August 2016 onwards.136 Mysterious as it is,

129
See Daniel Dobrygowski, Why Companies Are Forming Cybersecurity
Alliances, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/09/whycompanies-are-forming-cybersecurity-alliances [https://perma.cc/2XSZ-DUGZ]
(discussing cyber presence of non-state actors); Narayan Koirala, Cybersecurity: A
strategic imperative for Nepal, KATHMANDU POST (Oct. 18, 2019, 7:58 AM),
https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2019/10/18/cybersecurity-a-strategicimperative-for-nepal [https://perma.cc/6NPS-76BD] (discussing recent cyber
threats to Nepal and Nepalese cyber capabilities).
130
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40.
131
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40.
132
Greenberg, supra note 121.
133
Greenberg, supra note 121.
134
Greenberg, supra note 121.
135
Greenberg, supra note 121.
136
Scott Shane, Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Security Breach and Spilled
Secrets Have Shaken the NSA to Its Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/nsa-shadow-brokers.html
[https://perma.cc/37E9-E2TG].
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Shadow Brokers apparently is a non-State actor.137 Without this
hack, would NotPetya have happened? Moreover, there is the
apparently slower implementation of the Windows patch in Ukraine
by multinationals.138 Without this slow implementation would
NotPetya have happened? Finally, there is the deployment of
NotPetya, the origin of which remains contested. The story of
NotPetya thus involves Windows, the world’s leading operating
system, a hacker collective, the NSA, Ukraine, multinational
companies in Ukraine, and, according to Western intelligence,
Russia. At each stage of development, NotPetya was possible
because of an interaction between States and non-State actors. To
prevent events like NotPetya, or worse than NotPetya, means to
capture this interaction and connectivity between all of the players
involved, not just some of them.
The same kind of problem arises in the context of what has been
dubbed “the biggest espionage hack on record”: SolarWinds.139 The
hack accessed critical records of at least ten government agencies, as
well as multiple apex companies, such as Microsoft.140 This
operation had a clear espionage component.141 But it is also possible
that it could add “something more sinister” such as “inserting
‘backdoor’ access into government agencies, major corporations, the
electric grid and laboratories developing and transporting new
generations of nuclear weapons.”142 As one former national security
official put it, hackers “will surely have used its access to further
exploit and gain administrative control over the networks it
considered priority targets.”143 He goes on that for “those targets,
137
Bruce Schneider, Who Are the Shadow Brokers?, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/shadowbrokers/527778/ [https://perma.cc/K3CJ-Y83M].
138
See Greenberg, supra note 121.
139
Brian Barret, Security News This Week: Russia’s SolarWinds Hack Is a Historic
Mess, WIRED (Dec. 19, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/russia-solarwinds-hack-roundup/
(“Historic
Mess”) [https://perma.cc/G39M-C5VT].
140
Nicole Perlroth, David E. Sanger & Julian E. Barnes, Widely Used Software
Company May Be Entry Point for Huge U.S. Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/russia-cyberhack.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/SZ9H-JYUE].
141
Sanger, supra note 20.
142
Sanger, supra note 20.
143
Thomas P. Bossert, I Was the Homeland Security Adviser to Trump. We’re
Being
Hacked,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/opinion/fireeye-solarwinds-russiahack.html [https://perma.cc/S38L-934E].
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the hackers will have long ago moved past their entry point, covered
their tracks and gained what experts call “persistent access,”
meaning the ability to infiltrate and control networks in a way that
is hard to detect or remove.”144
Like NotPetya, U.S. intelligence is reasonably certain that the
hack was Russian government sponsored.145 However, official
statements “offered no details” and in fact “made no mention of . . .
the S.V.R., Russia’s most skilled intelligence agency.”146
Unofficially, the role of the S.V.R. is assumed.147
But also like NotPetya, this particular hack involved a great
number of private entities in multiple countries. It was a “a supplychain attack, meaning the pathway into the target networks relies on
access to a supplier.”148 This supply chain attack centrally involved
SolarWinds, an Austin, Texas, based cyber monitoring and
management company with unrivalled access to government and
corporate clients.149 The hack used a product named “Orion” and
was SolarWinds’s “flagship network management software” to
infiltrate targets.150 Centrally, “SolarWinds moved much of its
engineering to satellite offices in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Belarus.”151 At this point, the attack involves a key private company
doing business in multiple countries. Such supply chain attacks
thus again highlight the crucial importance of private actors—not
just government actors. And this particular attack highlights that
such attacks can take place in multiple physical locations across
national boundaries and thus involve a panoply of State and nonState actors in the process.
Tallinn 2.0 becomes dangerously ineffective as a governance tool
because it does not fully account for this connectivity of State and
non-State conduct in cyber. One could thus fairly apply the
observation to cyber that “[h]ybrid arrangements like these are
Id.
Id.
146
Perlroth, supra note 140.
147
See Bossert, supra note 143.
148
Bossert, supra note 143.
149
See Raphael Satter, Christopher Bing & Joseph Menn, Hackers used
SolarWinds’ dominance against it in sprawling spy campaign, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2020,
9:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/global-cyber-solarwinds/hackersused-solarwinds-dominance-against-it-in-sprawling-spy-campaignidUSKBN28Q07P [https://perma.cc/U763-QYA9].
150
Id.
151
Sanger, supra note 20.
144
145
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likely to become more common in the twenty-first century.”152
Cyber seems to feel this strain with particular force due to the
outsized role of non-State actors in controlling cyber infrastructure
and attacking it in turn. One should thus worry that “[g]iven the
phenomenon of hybridization, one of the challenges of international
law in the twenty-first century will be to identify the circumstances
in which a participatory arrangement should be pierced and the
ways in which the consequences of piercing should be dealt with.” 153
Here, Tallinn 2.0 falls short.
b. The Attribution Vulnerability
Given Tallinn 2.0’s State-centered approach, one of its central
features is to determine whether particular conduct was in fact State
conduct. As discussed in the previous section, this question is one
of “attribution” in public international law.154 As also discussed
above, Tallinn 2.0 on its face follows classic international law in
attributing conduct of State organs and conduct under the
instruction, direction or control of the State as well as conduct
adopted as its own by the State after the fact.155
But Tallinn 2.0 encounters an evidentiary problem. Cyber is
different from other State conduct in that we are dealing with virtual
actions rather than real ones. To explain, to determine whether an
organ of State acts in the brick-and-mortar context, one would point
to official documents from a Ministry.156 To determine whether
actions by non-State actors were under the instruction, direction, or
control of the government in the brick-and-mortar world one looks
for physical clues linking governmental authorities to the actions of
a formally independent actor.157 The task is one that follows
physical clues much in the way that Sherlock Holmes did in the
152
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT

324 (2013).
153
Id. at 325.
154
See section III(a) supra.
155
Id.
156
See PRZEMYSLAW SAGANEK, UNILATERAL ACTS OF STATES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2015) (discussing how unilateral declarations of can create
obligations for states).
157
See Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Acts of Non-State Actors: A
Comment on Griebel and Plüecken, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 307 (2009).
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Victorian age158—with the possible difference that some of the
documents previously housed in physical archives are now stored
in the cloud and that letters have been replaced by emails. Still, the
issue ultimately remains establishing real world conduct by “real
people” and not by machines.
Tallinn 2.0 attribution does not have this luxury. Rather, the best
we can do in cyber is to tie machines to actions. One example of this
is the recent Mueller investigation into interference in the 2016
election and particularly the indictment against Russian operatives
resulting from the probe.159 The indictments against Russian
military officers handed down by the Special Counsel were
premised upon the fact that certain communications had originated
from a certain accounts linked to a website infrastructure which, in
turn, could be linked to a specific person.160 Further, the indictment
linked bitcoin-denominated purchases in the same way to link them
back to the same individuals.161
No matter one’s conclusions whether such indictments may lead
to convictions, this type of search is reasonably different from
traditional sleuthing. It tries to follow virtual breadcrumbs such as
email addresses, bitcoin ledger entries, and cyber infrastructure, not
brick-and-mortar breadcrumbs.162
The Mueller investigation
followed evidence of online transactions through the bitcoin ledger
to establish that the bitcoin to purchase certain server space that in
turn had been linked to misinformation campaigns on social media
had commenced at the ominous GRU office building.163
The additional problem faced by this sort of investigation
compared to a brick-and-mortar investigation is that it must
ultimately make an inference from cyber reality to flesh-and-blood
people. The problem is that hacks are intended precisely to call such
inferences into question and to pretend that hackers are actually
other people, working from virtual locations and cyber
infrastructure other their own. In fact, that allegation was part of

158
See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, A
SCANDAL IN BOHEMIA (2016).
159
United States v. Netyksho et al, No. 1:18-cr-00215, 2018 WL 3407381
(D.D.C. July 13, 2018).
160
Id. at ¶ 21.a.
161
Id. at ¶¶ 59-61.
162
Id. at ¶¶ 21.a, 59-61.
163
Id.
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the indictment itself.164 The conceptual problem is to distinguish
between another, more cleverly disguised hack and the real person.
The problem in the attribution context is that attribution
ultimately must link back to a real person. But creating this link
between cyber conduct and a real person cannot rely upon
traditional attribution rules, as traditional attribution rules did not
typically encounter this problem. The closest classic international
law comes to the same set of problems is the world of espionage and
covert operations.165 But even there, what unmasks the covert agent
is physical evidence as opposed to inferences from virtual
evidence.166 Thus, even if Tallinn 2.0 sounds conventional in
following traditional international law of attribution, Tallinn 2.0 of
necessity innovates the law of attribution to provide a way to make
the last leap from the virtual to the real.
Tallinn 2.0 wrestles openly with this problem. Thus, in the
context of attribution of conduct by state organs to the state, it notes
that while “the use of governmental assets, in particular military
equipment like tanks and warships, has long constituted a nearly
irrefutable indication of attribution due to the improbability of their
use by persons other than State organs” this inference does not
translate easily to cyber.167 The problem is that “another State or a
non-State actor may have acquired control over government cyber
infrastructure.”168 Therefore, the use of cyber infrastructure only
“can serve as an indication that the State in question may be
associated with the operation.”169 The prevalence of spoofing makes
this more than an academic concern.170 Tallinn 2.0 leaves it vague
how attribution then is to function beyond the identification of the
relevant cyber infrastructure, pointing to human intelligence and
prudential factors.171
Id.
For a discussion of the international law of espionage, see Asaf Lubin, The
Liberty to Spy, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. 185 (Winter, 2020), which examines the legal
framework for peacetime espionage and limitations.
166
See
Robert
Hanssen,
FBI
(Feb.
20,
2001),
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/robert-hanssen
[https://perma.cc/Y4US-4PWW] (detailing how Robert Hanssen was unmasked
as a covert Soviet/Russian operative and how his traditional intelligence helped to
unmasked U.S. assets in Russia).
167
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 90 r. 15 ¶ 13.
168
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 90 r. 15 ¶ 13.
169
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 90 r. 15 ¶ 13.
170
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 91 r. 15 ¶ 15.
171
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 91-93 r. 15 ¶¶ 15-17.
164
165
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This approach to attribution leaves a sour taste. Particularly,
Tallinn 2.0 points to the 2013 cyber operation to shut down South
Korean banking and media servers and computers and asserts that
the operation was “allegedly North Korean.”172 Shortly after that
attack, hackers leaked Sony sensitive information, including
employee social security numbers. The attack was originally
attributed to North Korea. Since then, however, cyber experts have
expressed doubts about attributing the conduct to North Korea.173
Despite these doubts, North Korea remained a suspect for the
hack.174 This leaves two questions. The first is if there are doubts
about the Sony hack, should there be doubts about the South Korean
hack? Second, if attribution cannot firmly be established, then what
is the consequence for Tallinn 2.0’s state-based, fault-based
paradigm?
The same concern is only heightened in the context of attribution
due to governmental instruction, direction, or control under ILC
Article 8 and Tallinn 2.0 Rule 17.175 If it is difficult to establish action
by a state organ, this difficulty is only increased in the context of
indirect state action through the exercise of direction or control over
formally non-State conduct. Tallinn 2.0 notes as an example of
effective control “a case in which one State plans and oversees an
operation to use software updates to implant new vulnerabilities in
software widely used by another State in its governmental
computers. The former State concludes a confidential contract to
embed the exploits with the company that produces” the
software.176
This scenario outlined by Tallinn 2.0 recalls the reported covert
collaboration between Siemens and the German intelligence service,
the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Siemens constructed Iran’s nuclear
reactor for supposedly civilian purposes. Siemens used this access
to collaborate with the Bundesnachrichtendienst to allow German

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 91 r. 15 ¶ 14.
See Brian Todd & Ben Brumfield, Experts doubt North Korea was behind Sony
hack,
CNN
(Dec.
27,
2014,
3:05
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/12/27/tech/north-korea-expert-doubts-abouthack/index.html [https://perma.cc/B3VC-TVAZ].
174
Id.
175
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at art. 8; TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 94 r. 17.
176
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 95 r. 17 ¶ 7.
172
173
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intelligence to spy on the Iranian nuclear program.177 Siemens also
extended this cooperation to granting the Bundesnachrichtendienst
access to communications technology and thus allowing the agency
to decrypt Iranian secret communications.178 This collaboration also
gave the Bundesnachrichtendienst alleged privilege access to
encrypted messages from Russia, Egypt, and Oman.179 Tallinn 2.0
essentially updates such an intelligence cooperation from hardware
(communication system provided by Siemens) to software.
In fact, Iran accused Siemens of complicity in the Stuxnet
cyberattack on its nuclear centrifuges along just such grounds.
Stuxnet was a worm used to infiltrate the SCADA operating system
controlling centrifuges used to enrich fissile material used as fuel in
nuclear reactors (or payload in a nuclear bomb).180 The Stuxnet
worm destroyed the centrifuges at the Iranian nuclear facility and
reportedly was the first cyberweapon to lead to such physical
destruction.181 Iran alleged that the SCADA operating system had
purposefully left a backdoor open for the attack much in the way
suggested by the Tallinn 2.0 attribution approach, relying on the past
close collaboration between Siemens and intelligence services and
the fact that many of the critical components in Iran’s programs were
made by Siemens.182
The problem is that many cyber operations comprise
significantly more layers between the official State organs and the
shadowy perpetrators executing the operation. In this context,
Tallinn 2.0 is arguably of little to no help to attribute conduct to the
state: “a State’s preponderant or decisive participation in the
‘financing, organizing, training, supplying, and equipping . . . the
177
See Ehemalige Manager packen aus, MANAGER MAGAZIN (Apr. 12, 2008, 4:46
PM),
https://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/a-547036.html
[https://perma.cc/5LKP-NFMJ].
178
See NORBERT SIEGMUND, DER MYKONOS PROZESS 31 (2000).
179
See Alex Benesch, Stuxnet-Virus: Erneute Kooperation zwischen BND und
Siemens?, RECENTR.COM (Oct. 2, 2010), http://recentr.com/2010/10/02/stuxnetvirus-erneute-kooperation-zwischen-bnd-und-siemens/
[https://perma.cc/X5QY-2AGW].
180
See Iran accuses Siemens over Stuxnet virus attack, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-stuxnetidUSTRE73G0NB20110417 [https://perma.cc/7SG5-3EDN] [hereinafter Iran
Accuses Siemens].
181
See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital
Weapon, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-tozero-day-stuxnet/ [https://perma.cc/P7Z4-PF34].
182
Compare Iran Accuses Siemens, supra note 180, with TALLINN 2.0, supra note
22, at 95 r. 17 ¶ 7.
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selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of
the whole of its operation’ has been found insufficient to reach the
‘effective control’ threshold.”183 Ominously, this means that the
cyber activities of this group are not attributable to the State.184
One again has to place this conceptual language into
perspective.
A cooperation between Siemens and the
Bundesnachrichtendienst is arguably attributable to Germany because
Germany structured its alleged cooperation through an officially
sanctioned conduit (its intelligence service). But what about
“patriotic hackers?” The term gained currency when President
Putin of Russia was asked about Russian interference in the 2016
election. In response, “Russian President Vladimir Putin said . . . his
country has ‘never engaged in’ hacking another nation’s elections,
but left open the possibility that hackers with ‘patriotic leanings . . .
may try to add their contribution to the fight against those who
speak badly about Russia.’”185
Hitting precisely on Tallinn 2.0 concepts, President Putin
continued that “[h]ackers are free people, just like artists who wake
up in the morning in a good mood and start painting.”186 These
hackers may thus be supported by the Russian state—though
President Putin did not concede as much—but they are not under
the direction or effective control of the Russian State; they “are free
people.”187 Their conduct therefore is not attributable to the Russian
Federation.
This distinction between alleged German and alleged Russian
conduct shows the serious problem for the attribution provisions in
Tallinn 2.0. They fail to live up their promise precisely because of
the first problem identified in the previous section: only State
conduct is covered by Tallinn 2.0 and Tallinn 2.0 does not impose a
duty on the State to police its own cyberspace.188 This means that
actors can collaborate with States time and time again without being
subject to criminal sanction on the territories of these States.189 And
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 95 r. 17 ¶ 9.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 95 r. 17 ¶ 9.
185
Krishnadev Calamur, Putin Says ‘Patriotic Hackers’ May Have Targeted U.S.
Election, But He Denied the Russian State Was Involved, THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/putin-russia-uselection/528825/ [https://perma.cc/4RWS-X8L9].
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 44 r. 7 ¶ 7.
189
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 44 r. 7 ¶ 7.
183
184
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yet the conduct of these non-State actors is not attributable to the
State either as the State does not exercise sufficient control over the
operation.190 While at the time of this writing it is “too early to tell”
how the attribution story will play out in the SolarWinds hack,
similar questions will likely abound.191
Thus, it is one thing if the hack was perpetrated directly by a
Russian state organ (although again, it is at this point not clear that
it was so perpetrated even though there is significant suspicion to
that effect).192 It is another thing if it, too, was performed by
freelance patriotic hackers. Such a freelance approach would
certainly be possible with a pure intelligence hack193 (former
intelligence operatives sell information to the government after
receiving materials from the government). It would leave more to
chance to allow such freelancers to install backdoors and then sell
the access after the fact. But even such a strategy would not be
unheard of—Russian government officials have long been
suspected of relying on complex nominee structures to dissociate
themselves from sensitive but very high value transactions.194
Be that as it may, the fact that the hack remained undetected for
as long as it did means that an intruder of any competence is likely
to have cleaned up their tracks.195 It is unlikely that backdoors will
be easily discovered.196 And given that the hack itself was not
discovered in real-time, it is similarly unlikely that the hackers
would have left behind significant breadcrumbs without raising
suspicions that they meant to leave them.197 In either case, the
attribution analysis will be fraught with guesswork (and second
guesswork).
In other words, Tallinn 2.0 illustrates how to get between the wall
and the wallpaper of the Tallinn 2.0 approach (and thus escape
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 95 r. 17 ¶ 9.
Satter, supra note 149.
192
Satter, supra note 149; see also Bossert, supra note 143.
193
Calamur, supra note 185.
194
See DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS: WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW
RUSSIA 233 (2011) (discussing the theory of magic hands behind favorable business
deals in Russia).
195
See Bossert, supra note 143.
196
Bossert, supra note 143
197
Bossert, supra note 143; Dan Goodin, SolarWinds malware has “curious” ties
to
Russian-speaking
hackers,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Jan.
11,
2021),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/01/solarwinds-malwarehas-curious-ties-to-russian-speaking-hackers/
[https://perma.cc/4U8X-H3EE]
(raising concern of false flags in SolarWinds hack).
190
191
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lawful countermeasures). So long as the aid received from the State
is not itself a violation of another international norm (and frequently
the aid may well be innocuous enough, such as when the State
provides hardware or generic training),198 and so long as the State
has plausible deniability of what “patriotic hackers” are doing,199
and so long as these hackers make sure to take advantage of the
connectivity issues in cyber discussed in the previous section, the
underlying conduct is beyond the reach of the law.200 It is therefore
reasonable to suspect that these blind spots in Tallinn 2.0, when
combined, provide a blueprint for governance avoidance as much
as they provide a blueprint for a governance model.
c. The Fault Trap
Tallinn 2.0’s governance avoidance problem is further
exacerbated by its focus on responsibility.
This focus on
responsibility means that a State is only accountable if it acted
wrongfully. Accordingly, the state must be at fault for it to be
responsible for its conduct.
This fault paradigm constructs a dangerous governance trap. To
paraphrase Yoda the Elder, fault leads to fear. Fear leads to blame.
Blame leads to deflection. Deflection leads to willful blindness.201
Such willful blindness is one of the greatest threats to
governance structures. It does not proactively make information
available that could have been used to formulate accurate threat
assessments and devise effective responses to avoid or mitigate the
threat. In other words, it is trapped in the compartmentalization of
responsibilities that led to significant intelligence failures in the U.S.

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 95 r. 17 ¶ 9.
See id. at 41 r. 6 ¶ 39 (setting out the threshold for constructive knowledge).
200
See supra section III(a).
201
See STAR WARS, EPISODE I: THE PHANTOM MENACE (Lucasfilm 1999) (Yoda
the Elder noting that fear leads to anger and anger leads to suffering—the
mechanism of fear turning into anger and blame follows a similar logic, as anger in
the Star Wars saga is frequently caused by the blaming of others); see also HESIOD,
THEOGONY 7-9 (M.L. West trans., 1999) (Uranos fears Kronos and his siblings and
then blames the Titans for his fall, vowing revenge); David S. Rubenstein,
Immigration Blame, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 143-167 (2018) (discussing how blame
and blame-avoidance influence cognition and, in turn, policymaking).
198
199
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in the run up to 9/11.202 Concerns with responsibility and potential
blame led to an under-sharing of critical information and thus
culminated in a failure to respond to a national security threat that
otherwise might have been forestalled.203
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to avoid this fault trap through its general
diligence obligation.204 States have an obligation to halt activity they
know to cause significant adverse consequences internationally—
even if the State did not itself perpetrate these actions.205 It gives the
State an out to deflect into action rather than into inaction. Further,
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to remedy willful blindness concerns by making
States responsible for their constructive knowledge—that is,
knowledge that a like-situated State would have had in similar
circumstances.206
Tallinn 2.0’s attempt to escape the fault trap, however, tends to
lead right back into it. An example again helps illustrate this
problem. In the week of December 16, 2019, the City of Frankfurt
shut down its IT network.207 The reason for the shutdown was the
fear of a spread of an Emotet infection leading to ransomware
attacks.208
Emotet is “an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily
functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans.”209
An Emotet infection is notoriously hard to detect because it “can
evade typical signature-based detection.”210 It is further hard to
remove from infected systems.211 An Emotet infection spreads
through malspam.212 Importantly, Emotet can take over infected

202
See Amy Zegart, In the Deepfake Era, Counterterrorism Is Harder, THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
11,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/us-intelligence-needsanother-reinvention/597787/ [https://perma.cc/3VDR-2ZHQ].
203
John A. Gentry, Intelligence Failure Reframed, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 247, 250 (2008).
204
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 30 r. 6.
205
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40 r. 6 ¶ 36.
206
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 41 r. 6 ¶ 39.
207
Catalin Cimpanu, Frankfurt shuts down IT network following Emotet infection,
ZDNET (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/frankfurt-shuts-down-itnetwork-following-emotet-infection/ [https://perma.cc/NTD3-V278].
208
Id.
209
Alert (TA18-201A), Emotet Malware, CISA (July 20, 2018), https://www.uscert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A [https://perma.cc/S4BT-MACW].
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
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machines and disseminate more malspam from infected accounts.213
Emotet steals sensitive banking information from infected machines
and has since morphed into a ransomware tool.214
The City of Frankfurt’s actions were commendable in stopping
the spread of a potentially dangerous cyber-infiltration by cyber
criminals. Yet, had the City of Frankfurt (or the German
government) conducted a Tallinn 2.0 analysis, it might well have
been dissuaded from acting. The consequence of acting is an
admission by the City of Frankfurt that Emotet infections like the
one it suffered are in fact detectable and, if left unaddressed, can lead
to significant adverse consequences. In other words, it is an
admission of knowledge and thus a trigger for a diligence obligation
that the failure to abide is wrongful.215
This leads to a problem in its own right. Once knowledge is
admitted, the diligence obligation vests.216 It thus means that falling
short of acting diligently from that point forward entails fault, and
as such, liability.217 Importantly, inaction would have had no such
consequence: there was of yet no significant adverse consequence.
The measure was preventive, and as such, a failure to take it would
not have been wrongful under Tallinn 2.0.218 That means that
inaction is “free,” and action potentially exposes an actor to liability.
Anyone facing those consequences may well choose not to act out of
precaution and thus avoid disaster.
This not the end of the problem: taking action once implies an
obligation to take similar action again in the future or be subject to
countermeasures. Now that one has taken action, one has
constructive knowledge that future similar threats also will lead to
significant adverse consequences.219
Constructive knowledge
implies that to act once creates an obligation to act again. Action, in
213
See generally Emotet computer virus spreading in Japan, Suga warns, JPN. TIMES
(Nov.
28,
2019),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/28/national/emotet-computervirus-spreading-japan-warns-official/#.XgPSby3Mx8c [https://perma.cc/AF57X92J] (explaining that Emotet attaches to spoof emails, steals account information
and sends out new fake emails).
214
Emotet,
MALWAREBYTES,
https://www.malwarebytes.com/emotet
[https://perma.cc/46AR-S4ZC] (last visited Dec. 25, 2019).
215
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40 r. 6 ¶ 37.
216
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 40 r. 6 ¶ 37.
217
See generally TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 84 r. 14 (establishing that a State
is internationally responsible for cyber acts that are attributable to that State).
218
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 44-45 r. 7 ¶ 7.
219
See TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 41 r. 6 ¶ 39.
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other words, appears to create a preventive duty for future cyber
threats where none otherwise exists.220 This again is far from ideal.
It again, strictly speaking, would counsel to inaction rather than
action.
The fault trap thus creates incentives not to govern up, in the
sense of creating ever more sustainable governance structures that
progressively improve cyber safety. To the contrary, the fault trap
creates incentives to govern down, in the sense of acting only in a
limited set of circumstances after a threat has already materialized
to avoid future liability—or more pressingly, future lawful
countermeasures. The fault trap is deeply destructive of good
governance precisely because it creates no incentives to anticipate
and coordinate positive responses.
One might object that if the City of Frankfurt had not acted, it
certainly would have had to act in the aftermath of an Emotet attack.
It would have been left to clean up the mess of the cyberattack. This
may factually be true. Legally, however, the connectivity issue
outlined in section III(a) makes sure that the City of Frankfurt could
point to others as being at fault for any adverse consequences.221 It
could have pointed to vulnerabilities in recipients of City emails. It
could blame operating systems. It could even seek to blame a third
State for conducting a cyberattack against Germany. All of these
strategies would deflect blame, undercut constructive knowledge,
and lie fault at someone’s else feet. A fault paradigm, in other
words, is a horrible paradigm for any governance infrastructure to
evolve and adapt to emergent threats. Given the fluidity of cyber in
this respect, that is bad news for Tallinn 2.0.
d. Conclusion
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to do the right thing. It seeks to provide a legal
matrix to guide decision-making in cyber. It does so on the basis of
strong values embedded in general international law and an
analysis of state practice. Yet, as this section has shown, its Stateand fault-based approach has created significant issues for the
accomplishment of its goals. Thus, Tallinn 2.0 provides a roadmap
not only for compliance but also for avoidance. And the roadmap

220
221

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 44-45 r. 7 ¶ 7.
See supra section III(a).
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for avoidance is clearer (and cheaper) than the roadmap for
compliance.
It may be that this is the best that can be done. No other
translation may currently be possible. Bad incentives in general
international law can be a good incentive to devise a better, treatybased structure going forward.
As this Article outlines, a turn of the kaleidoscope might be able
to place the Tallinn 2.0 on stronger footing. This turn of the
kaleidoscope would, at least in the soft sense, impose greater
obligations on States. This makes it unlikely that States will shower
it with praise.
And yet, it will have two advantages. First, for States, it also
provides new partners with whom governance should become
significantly more feasible—apex platform, apex programming, and
apex infrastructure companies. Second, for international lawyers, it
provides a better means to give legal force to international legal
obligations, even in the absence of state-practice. It demonstrates
that the application of a general principle of law can overcome the
lack of positive consent to cyber norms. In this case, this more robust
set of obligations may in fact prompt action to codify a more
meaningful governance approach that would streamline the
respective diligence obligations and governance structures to
harness the promise of cyber.
IV.

CYBER-COMMONS

The core proposal of this Article is to overcome the problems of
the responsibility paradigm by replacing it with a commons
paradigm. Such a commons paradigm would move away from a
purely State-based approach to governance and allow additional
actors to become core governance participants. It would also move
away from a fault-based approach. Instead, it will focus on the
concept of using—and of correlative rights to use—resources pooled
in common between participants. This focus moves away from a
logic of blame to a logic of coordination.
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a. Defining Commons
Commons aggregate pooled resources. The classical example of
a commons is a grazing pasture.222 This grazing pasture does not
belong to any one farmer.223 It is either not owned at all or
communally owned by those who use it. The concern of a commons
is that overuse of the common pooled resource is unsustainable and
eventually destroys the commons together with the resources it
provided to its users. Classically, overgrazing destroys the
pasture.224
This classical definition of commons sets up a stark contrast
between resources that are privately owned and resources that are
not owned (or communally owned) but commonly used. This
dichotomy would suggest that commons principally refer to
property (for example, land) and that this property is not owned by
any one person: the grazing pasture is a commons because no one
person owns the pasture. It is this conception that led the Tallinn 2.0
experts to reject treating cyber as a commons.225
This classical definition does not do justice to commons or how
common pool resources are held. The key example of a common
pool resource that does not follow the dichotomy between private
and communal ownership is water.226 Water is a common pool
resource because a large number of community members rely upon
the same source of water in order to survive.227 Water and
particularly groundwater can be overused—that is to say, the
overuse of groundwater leads to the eventual complete exhaustion
or collapse of groundwater reservoirs.228 Such a collapse would

222

(1968).

See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244

Id.
Id.
225
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 12 r. 1 ¶ 5.
226
See generally Anne Hellum, Engendering the Right to Water and Sanitation:
Integrating the Experiences of Women and Girls, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER:
THEORY, PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS 300, 314 (Malcolm Langford & Anne Russell eds.
2017) (illustrating the integrated way in which poor African women use water for
daily activities).
227
Id.
228
Dennis Dimick, If You Think the Water Crisis Can’t Get Worse, Wait Until the
Aquifers
Are
Drained,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Aug.
21,
2014),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/8/140819-groundwatercalifornia-drought-aquifers-hidden-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/AS5A-RKX2].
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deprive all users of future water access. In this sense, groundwater
access is like access to a grazing pasture.229
Groundwater access is unlike access to a grazing pasture in an
important respect: the communities and farmers using the
groundwater have a potentially enforceable property right in the
water they use.230 The problem is that they hold inconsistent rights.231
This inconsistency could lead to the ejection—and thus loss of
rights—by a large swath of water right holders.232 This is a
consequence that is so destructive of communities relying upon
groundwater that it is unfathomable to impose.233 Alternatively, it
can act as an accelerant to insisting on one’s right and could hasten
the destruction of the groundwater reservoir; every rights holder
would increase use so as not to admit that prior use was
impermissible, thus hastening the demise of the commons.234
This story of groundwater as a commons is the story of water in
Southern California. As Elinor Ostrom’s classical Governing the
Commons outlines, communities in Southern California fought over
use of the same groundwater basins.235 California law, through the
reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines, in principle, would
have provided a means to resolve this legal dispute.236 Yet, the
reasonable use doctrine led to precisely the kind of disincentives
that might cause reservoirs to collapse because timing litigation
right was too treacherous to yield meaningful results.237 Negotiating
to a reasonable use of a common pooled resource—and treating the
reservoir as a commons—was the far more efficient solution.238
Ostrom provides yet another water-based example of a
commons—namely, access to water in the Zanjera in the

229
See Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent
Depletion, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1263, 1300 (2014).
230
See id.
231
See id. at 1299-1300.
232
See id. at 1302.
233
Id.
234
See generally OSTROM, supra note 32, at 104-110 (examining several
institutions to manage groundwater basins located beneath Los Angeles).
235
Id. See also Griggs, supra note 229.
236
Burke W. Griggs & James J. Butler, Jr., Groundwater in the American West:
How to Harness Hydrogeological Analysis to Improve Groundwater Management, in THE
WATER PROBLEM, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 113, 120
(Pat Mulroy ed., 2017).
237
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 114.
238
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 108-10.
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Philippines.239 Zanjeras are common irrigation works used to bring
water to farmland.240 Tenant farmers in particular were able to
exchange their labor in building these irrigation works for nonirrigated land for tenancy rights in newly irrigated parcels.241 The
irrigation works are communally maintained.242 Water-allocation
typically does not create problems so long as the irrigation works
are maintained.243 Yet, in droughts, water rights are by rotation, and
the closing of canals is communally guarded and enforced.244
b. Cyber as Commons
Treating cyber as a commons is not a new idea. A significant
literature has developed to treat cyber as a commons.245 Much of
this literature, as discussed in Tallinn 2.0 itself, analogizes cyber to
the deep sea.246 It therefore submits that cyber should be treated as
owned in common.247
This is not the only way to treat cyber as a commons. Rather,
one can treat cyber as a commons in the sense of water rights. Thus,
as in the context of water rights, cyber is certainly anchored in
property rights to be part of the cyber stream. As Tallinn 2.0 points
out, cyber infrastructure is physical and under the territorial
jurisdiction of States.248 In the same way, in the water context, there
is physical infrastructure linking a parcel of land to water.249
Further, in both contexts, this infrastructure implies a right to the
use of a flow of the common pooled resource. In the water context,
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82-83.
241
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82.
242
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82-86.
243
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 86-87.
244
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 67.
245
See generally, e.g., Shackelford, supra note 32, at 29-37 (analogizing global
commons regimes to cyber); see also Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy
of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 509-18 (2003) (discussing the
undesirable development of cyberspace away from a commons akin to a grazing
pasture towards an anti-commons defined by property rights); Sean Watts &
Theodore Richards, Baseline Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace, 22 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 771, 779-91 (2018) (critiquing the commons literature).
246
TALLIN 2.0, supra note 22, at 12 r. 1 ¶ 5.
247
See sources cited supra note 245.
248
TALLIN 2.0, supra note 22, at 12 r. 1 ¶ 5.
249
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82-87.
239
240
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the flow is access to a flow of ground water or flow from the
irrigation system when one’s turn in the rotation arrived.250 In the
cyber context, the right is one to access to connectivity and
information.
Despite these property rights anchoring cyber in public and/or
private ownership, cyber remains a commons in two respects. First,
what gives cyber value is precisely that it is a shared resource. The
point of cyber, its very definition, is global connectivity.251 Second,
cyber only works if it is diligently maintained by all of the global
participants.252
In both respects, cyber is like the Zanjeras in the water context.253
If the irrigation works are not maintained, the Zanjera farmers do not
receive access to water.254 This means that the Zanjera farmers rely
upon others doing their part in maintaining irrigation works in
order to receive the benefit they seek.255
This is also the case in the cyber context. In order to have the
benefit of the cyberspace we expect every time we go online, the
entire global cyber-infrastructure must be maintained and kept in
good repair.256 This means that every daily user of cyber, much like
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 86-87.
See Jennifer Bussell, Cyberspace, ENC. BRITANNICA (Mar. 12, 2013),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/cyberspace [https://perma.cc/3B7D-LVCP].
252
See id; Adrian Booth et al., Critical infrastructure companies and the global
cybersecurity
threat,
MCKINSEY
(April
11,
2019),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/criticalinfrastructure-companies-and-the-global-cybersecurity-threat#
[https://perma.cc/G2XA-XQEK] (detailing the need for global cyber-security
approaches and the danger of collateral damages from nonspecific attacks globally).
253
See generally OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82-7 (explaining the way Zanjeras
work).
254
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82-7
255
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 82-7
256
See generally Elena Chernenko, Oleg Demidov & Fyodor Lukyanov,
Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/increasinginternational-cooperation-cybersecurity-and-adapting-cyber-norms
[https://perma.cc/7YF4-MNXK] (examining the emergent problems of cyber
threats and inviting cooperation between States to tackle the problem in the future);
Ankit Fadia, Mahir Nayfeh & John Noble, Follow the leaders: How governments can
combat intensifying cybersecurity risks, MCKINSEY
(Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/ourinsights/follow-the-leaders-how-governments-can-combat-intensifyingcybersecurity-risks [https://perma.cc/ULP5-RNWW] (“Any attack on critical
infrastructure in one sector of a country can lead to disruption in other sectors as
well. An attack on a country’s telecommunications, for example, may disrupt
250
251
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the Zanjera farmer, relies upon the work of others beyond his or her
own control to make sure those crucial flows reach him or her. And
every State relies upon the work of other States and other platforms,
protocols, and operating systems.257 Cyber only works together.
Cyber is a common pooled resource, and cyberspace is a
commons because no one person, or even one group of persons, can
build cyberspace alone. Imagine building Instagram with only your
high school friends, LinkedIn with only your current work
colleagues, and TikTok with only your law school classmates.
Imagine an internet without PayPal, eBay, Amazon, or Google.
Imagine a moot court competition or law journal symposium
without Westlaw, interactive maps, or UberEats. It is not the same
thing. And you do not have to imagine this. All you have to do is
ask—is the carefully curated internet in the People’s Republic of
China or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the internet?258
And are people in the People’s Republics the better off for the
curating? Just look at the streets of Hong Kong, and you will have
the answer.259
c. Governing the Commons
This leaves the question of how to govern cyber as a commons.
The remainder of this Article will outline such an approach based
on a general nuisance principle. Before launching into that
discussion, however, a few guideposts from the commons literature
are needed to guide the discussion.

electronic payments. But this is just part of the problem” because of the global
impact of such threats on “an estimated 127 new devices connect[ed] to the internet
every second [globally]. Any disruption in digital connectivity is considered an
obstacle in the path of progress . . . .”).
257 See Chernenko, Demidov & Lukyanov, supra note 256.
258 See generally China, North Korea among 10 countries cited for extreme media
censorship:
Watchdog,
STRAITS
TIMES
(Sept.
10,
2019),
https://www.straitstimes.com/world/china-north-korea-among-10-countriescited-for-extreme-media-censorship-watchdog
[https://perma.cc/CJJ6-G738]
(regarding internet censorship in China, North Korea, and other countries).
259 See Jeremy Hsu, Fear of Internet Censorship Hangs Over Hong Kong Protests,
IEEE
SPECTRUM
(Nov.
22,
2019),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/techtalk/telecom/internet/fear-of-internet-censorship-hangs-over-hong-kongprotests [https://perma.cc/6RJT-3S44] (discussing the links between growing
internet censorship and the Hong Kong protests).
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The first point concerns the role of law. Law can function as a
set of textual rules to apply in a court-like setting.260 Criminal law
might function much in this way. But cyber is not a domain where
law could be applied with such a precision due to the lack of state
practice and normative consensus on cyber questions.261 Rather, law
is a tool to guide decision-making rather than to compel it.262
This feature of law is amplified in the commons governance
context.
The California groundwater commons example is
instructive.263 The courts in that context were inadequate to resolve
the growing commons crisis on their own.264 Litigation was too
slow, too expensive, and ultimately too unpredictable to serve as a
cure-all for the groundwater crisis.265 Rather, commons governance
came as a negotiated agreement, negotiated bit by bit in a trust
building exercise.266
But to conclude that law—and courts—had no role to play
would significantly underestimate the role of law in commons
governance. Quite to the contrary, law and legal processes
supported decision-making at every step of the way by framing the
question in terms of equitable use.267 Further, the courts provided a
means to enforce negotiated agreements as consent decrees.268 Law
was thus instrumental in bringing commons governance to a
successful outcome by empowering commons actors to
communicate with each other in an idiom capable of reaching
common ground and sustainable solutions.
The California story already hints at another feature of commons
governance: it takes all kinds of actors to make it work.269 This
approach to governance drawing in public and private actors and
hybrid institutions combining both private and public functions is
known as “polycentric” governance.270 The term “polycentric”
governance describes an arrangement which “[i]nstead of relying
strictly on hierarchical relations, as within a single firm . . . is
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 177-83.
See section II.
REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 183-194.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 103-42.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 114.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 114.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 114.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 103-42.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 119-23.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 133-36.
Shackelford, supra note 32, at 7-9.
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governed by negotiation and bargaining processes among many
different actors in several different arenas.”271 These processes, in
turn, interact with each other to diffuse the ultimate decisionmaking authority from a single place of central power to the entire
network of participants.272
As this description already suggests, it is a governance model
that can be and has been applied to cyber. It has been applied to a
discussion of cyber security.273 Similar structures are in place to
govern the development of internet code itself.274 Commons
governance, in other words, is already part and parcel of cyber
governance regimes even if the legal processes needed to support
them remain in shadow.
A key to the success of polycentric governance is to move away
from fault and towards cooperative trust-building. The point of
commons governance is not to blame someone when something has
gone wrong. It is to prevent things from going wrong in the first
place. For this reason, commons governance is particularly
successful when infraction rates are low and punishment of
infractions is not draconian but graduated, and thus not the
principal deterrent.275
Rather, the principal deterrent from
infracting is the violation of trust—and inherent threat of loss of
one’s own share of the common pooled resource.276
This feature of commons governance has two key takeaways for
the law needed to support it. First, the law, too, must move away
from a fault-based approach and create a language in which shared
use can take over as the principal governance paradigm. Law must
facilitate rather than prohibit, communicate rather than command,
support rather than judge, for commons governance to succeed.
And it must remain flexible when called upon to actually resolve a
dispute, so as not to disincentivize future shared use by overpunishing infractions in its own right, and thereby contributing to
an erosion of trust and continued cooperation.
Second, trust is good. Trust-but-verify is better. Successful
commons governance approaches always involve a form of mutual
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 135.
OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86.
273
Shackelford, supra note 32, at 6-26.
274
GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 134-39 (2010).
275
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 94-100.
276
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 94-100.
271
272
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monitoring.277 And this mutual monitoring is the most successful
when it is done by people interacting with each other on a frequent
and close basis.278 Neighbors watching neighbors is a powerful
incentive to act consistently with neighborhood standards for all
involved.279 Such monitoring works because the person monitoring
will herself have to live with the rules she applies to others—the
person monitoring will in turn be monitored by the very people he
or she called out for an infraction. But if a person respected for
“walking the walk” in the community could call out a person for an
infraction, the loss of communal standing is a powerful disincentive
for defecting from the commons governance paradigm in the first
place.
This second takeaway from commons governance suggests that
the law should always look to build communities that in turn will
help to govern up. Neighbors should monitor neighbors. But they
should do so not to gain a petty advantage that hurts the commons
in the long run and thus govern down. They should do so in a
manner that protects the sustainability of shared use. The way to
achieve this second goal is again to look to polycentricity. A
hierarchical system can reward “collaborators” who seek personal
gain to the detriment of the common good. A polycentric
governance process that subjects all to reciprocal obligations and
enforcement is less susceptible to such incentives.
V. CYBER-NUISANCE
This Article proposes that the best way to institute a commonsbased paradigm of cyber governance is to embed a principle of cyber
nuisance in cyber governance decision-making. This part first
defines what general principles are in section A. Section B then
establishes the existence of such a nuisance principle for governance
of correlative rights. Section C subsequently discusses how this
principle would function in the cyber context.

277
278
279

OSTROM, supra note 32, at 94-100.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 94-100.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 94-100.
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a. A Return to Principles
General principles are an overlooked source of international law.
The discussion in Tallinn 2.0 focuses on customary international
law, application of international treaty norms by analogy, and the
translation of potentially applicable international law norms drawn
from other areas of international law.280 Yet, it reasonably neglects
general principles of law.
This neglect is understandable to a point. General principles of
law are frequently treated with mild derision by international law
academics. One went as far as suggesting that general principles are
nothing but platitudes translated to Latin.281 Further, general
principles of law are reasonably far away from “positive”
expressions of the will of State on the international stage. To use
them therefore has an air of unwelcome natural law indulgence.282
That being said, general principles of law formally are co-equal
sources of international law alongside treaties and custom.283 They
were included in the source of international law precisely to deal
with situations in which no existing customary rule or treaty rule
clearly resolves a given problem.284 The point of general principles
is to provide means to avoid a conclusion that there is no
international law governing a particular problem.285 As this is
precisely the situation in which cyber currently finds itself, it would
be prudent, given the structure of the sources of international law,
to consult them.
The snark-filled remark that general principles of law are
platitudes turned Latin similarly should be no reason to ignore
them.286 It is certainly true that many general principles have Latin
names.287 It is similarly true that many of them appear to express
platitudes (think ex iniuria non oritur ius—which flippantly could be

TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 12 r. 1 ¶ 5.
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 54 (1991).
282
BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 3-4, 19 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
283
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 § (1)(c), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1051, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
284
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 93 (rev. ed. 2011).
285
Id.
286
SCHACHTER, supra note 281281.
287
CHENG, supra note 282, passim.
280
281
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translated as “a wrong can’t make a right”).288 But that does not
mean that these principles are not helpful in a pinch. Just think how
many times sophisticated lawyers refer to estoppel and “a wrong
can’t make a right” will appear somewhat less absurd a proposition
to rely upon in legal argument.289
That is not to say that the proof of a general principles is always
easy. Quite to the contrary, it is treacherous. Proof of a general
principle requires one to establish that a representative set of
relevant legal systems would address a core problem in a similar
way.290 This means that it is not enough to look in a Restatement or
Code. Some legal systems have the exact same rule—sometimes
verbatim—on the books but apply them differently.291 Others do not
appear to have the same rule on the books at all but reach similar
results in practice all the same.292 One therefore has to examine how
the law works in practice. The method to do so is known as
functional legal comparison.293 And it is by far the best suited to
establish a general principle.
The benefit of general principles of law established on the basis
of functional legal comparison is that they can find application
beyond international law. General principles of law established on
the basis of functional comparison also form part and parcel of
transnational law.294 Transnational law is, at a minimum, a material
source of law for global business transactions.295 Principles drawn
from transnational law are habitually applied in international
commercial arbitration.296

CHENG, supra note 282, at 187.
T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern
Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 439-40 (2008).
290
For a full discussion, see Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, The Privacy Principle, 42
YALE J. INT’L L. 345, 367-75 (2017) [hereinafter Sourgens, Privacy]; Michael D. Nolan
& Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, Issues of Proof of General Principles of Law in International
Arbitration, 3 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 505, 509-10 (2009).
291
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law I, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 24 (1991).
292
Sourgens, Privacy, supra note 290290, at 371.
293
Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 342 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 15-31 (3d ed. 1998).
294
See Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of
Decision Making?, 17 ARB. INT’L 59, 62 (2011).
295
Id.
296
See Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 290290.
288

289
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A great deal of transactions related to cyber governance are
currently resolved in international commercial arbitration.297 These
proceedings, too, frequently rely upon a kind of transnational law.
Fitting existing stereotypes, this particular field of transnational law
gave itself a Latin name—the lex digitalis.298
A general principle of law on cyber security drawn from private
law stands a good chance to integrate both into public international
law and the amorphous world of the lex digitalis. It thus would be a
candidate that could live up to the promise of commons governance
through polycentricity. Or, to put it in English, it would have the
benefit of coordinating State-based and non-State based global
approaches to cyber governance and thus would be able to build a
legal bridge where one is sorely needed.
So far, the appeal to general principles underlying this Article
has been largely formal: general principles are a formal source of
international law and a material source of transnational law, so we
should consult them. One therefore might ask: why is it a good idea
functionally to consider general principles? To answer this
question, consider why one looks for a legal decision-making matrix
as opposed to, say, an ideological one. The premise of this Article
has been that lawless spaces are inherently undesirable and that one
should strive to provide legal tools for decision-making no matter
what. It is in good company in doing so.299
The reason for this insistence is that law does a particularly good
job, all things considered, to weigh conflicting values and balance
countervailing interests in an even-handed and predictable
manner.300 While legal solutions may not always be fair, they are
always identifiably similar in the way they resolve value conflicts.301
Or, to put this in more practical terms, one will always know when
“the lawyers got involved” even if one does not know the law of a
particular jurisdiction.
The reason to appeal to general principles is that general
principles help draw up a kind of grammar or map for legal

297
See ICANN Programs, INT‘L CENT. FOR DISP. RESOL. (2021),
https://www.icdr.org/icann [https://perma.cc/ZMT2-FGXK].
298
Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 AN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 247 (2009)
[hereinafter Michaels, Pluralism].
299
REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 21; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 284284, at 93.
300
See REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 185 (noting the need for an eclectic legal
method).
301
See REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 185.
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decision-making in general.302 They show what kind of values are
involved and how these values could be balanced against each
other. The fact that disparate legal systems arrive at a broadly
similar way of balancing value conflicts is helpful no matter the
formal force of general principles in their own right. It suggests that
to weigh differently risks losing sight of, or underplays, a value
otherwise held in higher regard by legal decision-making.303 Any
such cognitive dissonance in the law (or dare one say, false
consciousness) should give one pause whether a particular
prescription is chosen for its expedience to resolve a particular
problem in one’s perceived favor.304 In short, if one strives to uphold
the rule of law, one should take law seriously. Disregarding general
principles is a poor way to do so.
This leaves the question which legal system to examine. Space
constraints—or more to the point, the attention span of the reader—
counsel against a universal comparative exercise. This Article, and
the project of which it forms a part, suggest that one way to narrow
down the legal systems to include in a study is to look to States that
have a particular role to play in cyber and cyber operations.305 If
these States hail from diverse legal systems and socio-economic
experience, the choice would have both relevance to the problem to
be solved (how do I convince a lawyer from X that what we are
doing is wrong?) and represent the significant diversity of legal
systems of the world. This Article therefore has chosen to examine
the laws of the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the
People’s Republic of China, Israel, and shari’a.
This formally leaves two continents out of the study: much of
Africa and South America. As there is no State that would easily fit
the criteria chosen to pick legal systems, the Article has chosen not
to study a specific jurisdiction from these continents in their own
right. It will, however, note where representative jurisdictions from
these continents follow a similar path to resolving the underlying
problem while keeping an eye on the jurisdictions which, for good
or ill, are most closely aligned with cyber operations and thus most

302
See REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 190-94 (discussing the task of mapmaking in international law).
303
See REISMAN, supra note 152152, at 185.
304
Claire A. Hill, Cheap Sentiment, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 69-75 (2018);
Mark G. Yudof, ‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’: The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 589, 620-21 (1988).
305
Sourgens, Privacy, supra note 290290, at 375-78.
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immediately are called upon to step up their involvement in global
cyber governance.
b. Nuisance, Correlative Rights, and Cyber-Governance
The concept of commons governance is firmly established in all
of the legal systems studied. What is more, the concept of commons
governance follows broadly on what common lawyers would
consider the logic of nuisance. The nuisance principle—as it
develops in this section—looks to restrain unreasonable overuse
through a protection of correlative rights. It does so without falling
into a fault-based paradigm. It further provides carefully calibrated
incentives to cooperate in use and respect the reasonable correlative
rights of one’s neighbors. In short, nuisance is a principle that meets
the requirements of commons governance well.
The key to nuisance is that it is not only a principle that can guide
decision-making, though it is that too.306 It is also a principle that
can lead to the assertion of a cause of action.307 Thus, it is not just a
means to think about factors impacting decision-making, it is also a
means to police this decision-making at the margins. It thus
provides an additional incentive for decision makers to act in a
manner consistent with the sustainability of the commons as a
failure to do so could, in the right circumstances, become actionable.
Nuisance finally exhibits key features to support polycentric
governance.308 As discussed below, nuisance and correlative rights
always look to neighborhood standards in one form or another. The
first imperative of nuisance is common use protection, the
enforcement of correlative rights. But precisely how this imperative
is met is defined by context as the rights of each are correlative to
those of the others in the commons. Nuisance, in other words,
respects and enforces the self-regulatory equilibria reached in a
particular community. It does not seek to displace them.
Further, nuisance as a general principle has the benefit of being
seamlessly enforceable. A principle of cyber-nuisance would be a
general principle of international law. As such, it is a principle that
306
See REISMAN, supra note 152, at 183-90 (discussing the contextual-policy
based mode of international law).
307
See Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 588, 605,
607 (Tex. 2016); Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada) 1938/1941, R.I.A.A. 1905.
308
See OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86.
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should govern the decision-making of States.309 But it is more than
just a general principle of international law. It is also a general
principle of transnational law—that is, a general principle of private
law that is enforceable in international commerce.310 This, too,
supports the polycentric nature of commons governance.311 Rather
than capturing only a principle exclusive to State concerns in cyber,
the same principle also guides corporate concerns. Given the power
of apex platforms, operating systems, and infrastructure companies,
this expansion of the scope of application of the principle means that
these actors are finally brought into the fold. Not only that, but a
failure by these actors to take commons concerns into consideration
in making their own business decisions would provide a ready
cause of action—and not just for the business partners of these
companies in transnational commerce. Rather, cyber-nuisance, once
fully adopted, provides a ready domestic means for affected parties
to cause compliance by private actors no matter where they might
be located.
i.

United States

Restatement (Second) of Torts is the classic statement of
nuisance law in the United States.312 The Restatement distinguishes
between private and public nuisance.313 The Restatement defines a
private nuisance as conduct, whether intentional and unreasonable
or otherwise negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous, which
legally causes the invasion of another’s interest in land.314 A
nuisance can arise out of either an action or an omission.315 The
Restatement provides that a failure to act constitutes a nuisance if
there is some positive duty to “prevent or abate the interference with
the public interest or the invasion of the private interest.”316

LAUTERPACHT, supra note 284284, at 93.
KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX
MERCATORIA 202 (2d ed. 2010).
311
OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 281-86.
312
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). I will refer to it as
the “Restatement” in the text from here on out for ease of reference.
313
Id. at § 821.
314
Id. at § 822.
315
Id. at § 824.
316
Id. at § 824(b).
309

310
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The Restatement further treats as intentional an interference or
invasion, which the perpetrator “knows [will result] or is
substantially certain to result from his conduct.”317 To constitute a
nuisance, such intentional interference or invasion must be
“unreasonable.”318
To determine if it is unreasonable, the
Restatement weighs the gravity of the harm against the utility of the
conduct, looking to the respective social benefits of the interests
involved and the extent and character of the harm and conduct.319
The Restatement defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public.”320 The
Restatement explains in the comments that “[a] public right is one
common to all members of the general public” and that the right “is
collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone
has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently
injured.”321 The Restatement cites water pollution as a key example
of such a public right.322 The Restatement then again uses a
multifactor test to weigh whether the interference with the public
right is unreasonable.323 Importantly, these factors look to public
safety and public peace.324 They further consider “whether the
conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or
long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know,
has a significant effect upon the public right.”325
So far, the Restatement approach to private nuisance at least
appears to take a fault-based approach. That is, the Restatement
suggests that one must prove either negligence (and as such tortious
in its own right) or intentional endangerment.326 This impression
however is misleading.
Particularly, as a brilliant study by Professor Jill Fraley has
shown, state courts do not follow this tort-based approach to
nuisance but rather anchor nuisance in property law and the right

317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326

Id. at § 825(b).
Id. 312at § 822.
Id. at §§ 826-28.
Id. at § 821B.
Id. at § 821B, cmt. g.
Id.
Id. at § 821B(2).
Id. 312at § 821B(2)(a).
Id. at § 821B(2)(c).
Id. at § 822.
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to exclude.327 As Professor Fraley explains, “few courts have
adopted this switch in the intent requirement for nuisance.”328
Instead, “a larger number of states by far maintain the traditional
position, which extends liability for nuisance beyond acts that are
intentional or negligent to interferences more generally, regardless
of the conduct of the defendant.”329
What Professor Fraley correctly recognizes is that nuisance
critically goes to the right to exclude others from property. 330 From
a property perspective, nuisance is a claim which lies for the
unreasonable interference with enjoyment of property rights that is
not a trespass.331 The key to understanding this dominant
understanding of nuisance in the courts is that liability is not strict—
rather, it focuses on the reasonableness of the interference.332
To put another way, nuisance properly construed is a claim that
lies in the context of the undue interference with correlative rights.333
Correlative rights exist when multiple people have rights to a
common pool resource.334 These correlative rights are negative
rights: they impose a duty on each user of the common pool
resource to act so as not to destroy the entitlement of another user.335

327
See Jill M. Fraley, Liability for Unintentional Nuisances: How the Restatement
of Torts Almost Negligently Killed the Right to Exclude in Property Law, 121 W. VA. L.
REV. 419, 451 (2018) (“[N]uisance is quintessentially about property, not about tort.
The primary function of nuisance law is to limit the normally rather unlimited
freedom that a property owner has to use her land as she likes.”).
328
Id. at 421.
329
Id. at 422.
330
Id. at 423.
331
Id. at 453; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property in the Law of Nuisance, 90
VA. L. REV. 965, 992-6 (2004).
332
See Fraley, supra note 327, at 456 (“Subsets of nuisance law were strict . . . .
Outside those subsets, however, nuisance law was not unlimited.”); see also Smith,
supra note 331, at 992 (“Under more modern approaches to nuisance, balancing tests
are often invoked at the liability or remedy stage”).
333
See Bradford W. Wyche, A Guide to the Common Law of Nuisance in South
Carolina, 45 S.C.L. REV. 337, 357 (1994) (“Similarly, in Young v. Brown, the court
stated that ‘due regard must be had to the correlative rights of the parties’ in
determining whether an activity should be declared a private nuisance” (quoting
212 S.C. 156, 169 (1948)); but see Tara K. Righetti, Correlative Rights and Limited
Common Property in the Pore Space: A Response to the Challenge of Subsurface Trespass
in Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10420, 1043132 (2017) (discussing the dangers of watering down trespass with a Restatement
version of nuisance).
334
Pierce, supra note 36, at 245-46.
335
Pierce, supra note 36, at 246.
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But correlative rights also give users a positive right to access and
enjoyment of the common pool resource.336
One common example of correlative rights is the situation in
which multiple lessees produce oil and gas under multiple distinct
leases from a single formation.337 Correlative rights here have two
parts: (1) the right to produce from, and duty to preserve, the
integrity of the reservoir; and (2) the right to, and duty not to
interfere with, a reasonable portion of the common pooled
resource.338
The interference with a correlative right could be actionable in
trespass.339 Yet, this trespass logic has been receding.340 Rather, the
focus more appropriately is on the loss of one’s own right to use by
another’s use of the correlative share of a common pool resource.341
This focus now again sounds peculiarly like nuisance construed
as a property law concept. The interference with correlative rights
frequently is not a trespass for the reasons outlined by Professor
David Pierce in his seminal work on oil and gas rights.342 This leaves
the question whether it is an actionable infringement of the right to
a common pooled resource under the second string of “trespass or
nuisance.”343 The main objection developed to such a classification
advanced by Professor Pierce is that “nuisance is a tort remedy to
protect property; it does not define the property itself.”344
Correlative rights, on the other hand, do so define the property. 345
This much of course is true.

Pierce, supra note 36, at 246.
Pierce, supra note 36, at 246, 253-255.
338
Pierce, supra note 36, at 256.
339
Pierce, supra note 36, at 259-64.
340
See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 4
(Tex. 2008) (holding “the rule of capture bars recovery” of any damages that may
have been available under a trespass approach). For a discussion of the case, see
Theresa D. Poindexter, Correlative Rights Doctrine, Not the Rule of Capture, Provides
Correct Analysis for Resolving Hydraulic Fracturing Cases [Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 755, 756 (2009) (“By
failing to analyze trespass, the court did not properly apply the rule of capture”).
341
Pierce, supra note 36, at 259-64.
342
Pierce, supra note 36, at 259-64.
343
Colleen E. Lamarre, Owning the Center of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and
Subsurface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 457, 47879 (2011) (discussing Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Ark. 1980)).
344
David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas
Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 768 (2009).
345
Id.
336
337
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The point remains however that the interference with the right to
access a commons, once that right has been defined, is a nuisance. If
there is no right without a remedy, nuisance thus has a significant
role to play in defining correlative rights.346 This is so in jurisdictions
that do not follow Restatement, as Fraley has correctly explained.347
In those jurisdictions, nuisance has begun balancing the relative
rights of users against each other and thus to bring in force the best
approximation of their reasonable use rights from the common pool
resource.348
Even in jurisdictions like Texas that more closely follow the
Restatement approach, however, Professor Pierce’s observation
makes the substantial interference with a correlative right
remediable as a nuisance. Per Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v.
Gardiner, nuisance at Texas law is a “legal injury involving
interference with the use and enjoyment of real property.”349
Crosstex further established that the interference must be substantial
to rise to the level of a nuisance.350 The cause of action to recover for
such nuisance in Texas requires showing of intent (intent to harm or
substantial certainty of harm) or negligence (duty, breach, causation,
harm).351 The allegation that a person violated correlative rights
provides the predicate for such a claim: correlative rights are
negative rights and create a legal duty the breach of which would
satisfy the negligence prong.352 If the breach causes substantial
interference with the enjoyment of correlative rights, it can thus be
remedied as a nuisance. This correlative right cause of action
seeking to remedy a nuisance then even under Texas law returns to
its property roots: it could benefit from an injunction as opposed to
mere money damages.353
This distinction between trespass and nuisance makes a
difference. Another Texas case currently making waves, Lightning

346
Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable
Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1426 (2015) (“The Supreme Court has not been
completely faithful to no right without a remedy.”).
347
Fraley, supra note 327, at 423.
348
Fraley, supra note 327, at 457-58.
349
Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 588.
350
Id. at 595.
351
Id. at 605, 607.
352
Pierce, supra note 36, at 245-46.
353
Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/2

2021]

Cyber-Nuisance

1057

Oil v. Anadarko E&P Offshore, illustrates why.354 The case involved
facts typically seen only on a Property law exam: Lightning Oil held
a lease to produce oil and gas from the owner of the relevant mineral
estate.355 Anadarko meanwhile sought and received the right from
the surface owner to drill across the land to access minerals adjacent
to Lightning’s lease.356 Lightning Oil objected to Anadarko’s activity
as inconsistent with Lightning Oil’s rights under the lease.357
Anadarko offered to move its drill site and Lightning Oil made clear
that it would object to any drilling activity by Anadarko.358
Lightning Oil eventually claimed for trespass and tortious
interference with contract.359
The Texas Supreme Court rejected both claims.360 In focusing its
analysis on the relationship of the surface estate and the mineral
estate, the court placed them in a position that eerily looks like
correlative rights.361 Then comes the key passage: “an unauthorized
interference with the place where the minerals are located constitutes
a trespass as to the mineral estate only if the interference infringes
on the mineral lessee’s ability to exercise its rights.”362 In context,
this is no longer a trespass. The Lightning Oil court treated the
question as one of nuisance akin to Crosstex—it required a nontrifling interference with the exercise, that is, enjoyment, of a right as
opposed to any infringement of an absolute right.363 Finding no
interference with the use right, the Lightning court dismissed.364 To
predict future holdings post-Lightning, the correlative rights and
nuisance approach is more likely to hit on the concerns raised in
Lightning than the trespass jurisprudence would: to satisfy Texas

354

2017).

Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Offshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex.

Id. at 43.
Id.
357
Id.
358
Id.
359
Id.
360
Id. at 53.
361
Id. at 48-49.
362
Id. at 49.
363
Compare Lightning Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 48-9 (seeking to square its analysis
with the near absolute nature of the rights of the mineral estate as dominant estate),
with Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 595 (requiring non-trifling interference with use for
nuisance).
364
Lightning Oil, 520 S.W.3d at 53.
355
356
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courts to intervene, one must prove a substantial impairment of
one’s use as opposed to a theoretical one.365
This logic extends further. Thus, one of the key remedies for a
nuisance is abatement of the nuisance (its removal) and may involve
self-help to bring it about.366 This concept was further expanded in
a commons-oriented fashion. In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Development Co. the Supreme Court of Arizona was called upon to
resolve the classic coming-to-the-nuisance case.367 A real estate
developer began developing a sub-division next to a feedlot.368 The
feedlot (predictably) emitted smells not to the liking of potential
buyers in the subdivision.369 The developer asserted a nuisance
claim, relying particularly on the fact that the feedlot operator did
not comply with health and safety ordinances by permitting
conditions on its property that “constitutes a breeding place for flies,
rodents, mosquitoes and other insects.”370 The feedlot owner
defended on the basis that the developer had come to the
nuisance.371
The case is interesting for its ultimate resolution of the dispute.
The feedlot had to move.372 This can easily be reconciled with the
tort and fault-based conception of nuisance in the Restatement.373
What cannot be reconciled with such a perspective is that the court
also ordered the developer to pay for the move.374 The ostensible
victim of the nuisance had to pay for the removal of the nuisance.375
This is not consistent with a fault-based understanding as the
wrongdoer is not typically compensated to desist from their

365
For a full treatment of the question of subsurface rights in U.S. common
law through the nuisance lens, see Joseph A. Schremmer, Getting Past Possession:
Subsurface Property Disputes as Nuisance, 95 WASH. L. REV. 315, passim (2020). For its
discussion of Lightning Oil Co., see id. at 361-64.
366
Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610.
367
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz.
1972).
368
Id. at 705.
369
Id.
370
Id. at 706 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-601).
371
Id. at 706-07.
372
Id. at 708.
373
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979).
374
Spur Industries, 494 P.2d at 708.
375
Id.
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wrongdoing.376 Nuisance cannot be fault based if it can require
contribution from the person seeking to enjoy their right to be put in
a position to enjoy it.
But such a result is perfectly consistent with a commons
rationale of nuisance as protecting the correlative rights of users of
a commons. Maintenance of the commons requires contributions
from all participants in the commons.377 To demand one’s right of
access therefore also means that one must be willing to contribute to
the maintenance of the commons. When such maintenance requires
others to incur expenses, all must reasonably participate in them.
Claiming a right to the commons is neither self-centered nor is it
free. It is communal, and it is earned.
ii.

France

As a quintessential civil law jurisdiction, France approaches the
question of nuisance in a manner that is both startlingly different
from and startlingly similar to U.S. law. The civil law tradition
derives from and is a “reception of” the Roman law.378 One of the
most authoritative restatements of Classical Roman law is the Digest
of Justinian.379 The Digest of Justinian provides in relevant part that
“every person may act as he pleases on his own property, so long as
he immits [sic] nothing on the property of another.”380 This proviso
provides the foothold for a conception of correlative rights in Roman
law.
This Roman law principle was received in French law in terms
of the “droits de voisinage,” “troubles de voisinange,” or “neighbors’
rights. France exported its conception of trouble de voisinage in one

376
The Court sought to avoid this conclusion by stating that the victims were
the customers of the plaintiff and not the plaintiff and moving on an ostensible basis
of comparative fault. Id. This rationale is difficult to maintain given that the Court
ruled that the plaintiff had standing and the victims on whose behalf the Court
appeared to act did not appear in the proceedings. Id. at 706.
377
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 2, at 82-7 (discussing early irrigation
communities in the Philippines).
378
Leon E. Trakman, “Legal Traditions” and International Commercial
Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 5 (2006).
379
Id.
380
Zigurds L. Zile, Judicial Control of Land Use in France, 45 CORNELL L. REV.
288, 289 (1960) (translating Digest 8.5.8, § 5).
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form or another to other jurisdictions. For example, the concept was
incorporated in Senegalese civil law.381
These neighbors’ rights on their face differ markedly from
nuisance.382 Nuisance distinguishes between public and private
nuisance. Neighbors’ rights deem that public nuisance is a question
for administrative regulation as opposed to civil law rights.383
Claims of public nuisance would have to be brought to “the
authorities” as opposed to the courts.384 All one could claim for, on
its face, would be private nuisance and the private harm suffered by
a neighbor as opposed to the harm done to the community.385
At the same time, neighbors’ rights are startlingly similar to the
law of nuisance. For one, neighbor’s rights sit at the uneasy
intersection of property law and the law of obligations, particularly
delict (or tort).386 Problematically, French civil law was historically
incomplete and did not deal with the emission of gases, odors, noise,
or vibrations from one property to the property of the neighbor.387
This area of law therefore was developed by combining concepts
from the right to exclude and the right of enjoyment in the law of
property with the general delictual or tort principles that intentional
or negligent conduct causing harm to another requires the payment
of compensation.388 This combination of areas of law permits French
judges to enjoin fruitful and lawful use of land that is nevertheless
unduly disruptive to the user’s neighbors.389
French law is functionally similar to U.S. nuisance law and the
law of correlative rights. It requires a showing of the invasion of

381
See André Tunc, La responsabilité civile dans trois récentes codifications
africaines, 19 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 927, 931 (1967); see also
DIDIER MARTIN, DROIT CIVIL ET COMMERCIAL SENEGALAIS 103-04 (1982) ; Ibrahima Ly
& Papa Meissa Dieng, Le Senegal, in LA MISE EN OEUVRE NATIONALE DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT DANS LES PAYS FRANCOPHONES 389, 399 (Michel
Prieur ed., 2003).
382
See Vanessa Casado Perez & Carlos Gomez Liguerre, From Nuisance to
Environmental Protection in Continental Europe, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1010-11 (2019)
(for a comparative analysis).
383
Zile, supra note 380, at 294.
384
Zile, supra note 380, at 294.
385
Zile, supra note 380, at 294.
386
Zile, supra note 380, at 294.
387
Zile, supra note 380, at 294.; Casado, supra note 382, at 1010-11.
388
Zile, supra note 380, at 297-8.
389
ANNIE CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, DROIT DES BIENS 167 (2d ed. 2007).
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another’s property right.390 It further conceived of this invasion as
coming from the use of a property right.391 In short, it was an action
that was as much in rem—about the land or lands involved—as it
was in personam—about the owner of the land. This echoes
American nuisance.392 Similarly, it requires a showing of abuse of
right.393 This also mirrors American nuisance.394 Finally, both
require a showing of causation.395
The French understanding of abuse of right is particularly
helpful to show the striking functional similarities between
American nuisance and French neighbor’s rights. An abuse of rights
is the exercise of a right in a manner that is ultimately unreasonably
destructive of the interests of another.396
“Unreasonably
destructive” here can be understood as disproportionately
disruptive.
This disproportion is then measured against
neighborhood standards to determine whether the use of the land in
question is normal or abusive.397
But it can also be understood as disruptive of the right of a
neighbor to access to a commons or quasi commons. Specifically,
the French law of neighborhood rights is historically concerned with
rights to groundwater. In the neighborhood right context, early
cases such as Badoit v. André or Forissier v. Chaverot stood for the
proposition that groundwater rights are treated as a resource that
cannot be unreasonably captured by any one person due to an
absolute ownership claim—water does not belong to any one
person.398 Rather, in these historical cases, water may only be
reasonably exploited or enjoyed by all who share in the reservoir.399
French law here grappled with the same problem as the correlative
rights and commons problem in U.S. law.

390

166-73.
391

166-73.

Zile, supra note 380, at 297-98; CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at
Zile, supra note 380, at 297-98; CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at

Spur Industries, 494 P.2d at 708.
Zile, supra note 380, at 297-98, 302-09; Casado, supra note 382, at 1010-11.
394
Wyche, supra note 333, at 357.
395
Restat. 2d, supra note 312, at § 822.
396
Zile, supra note 380, at 299-302.
397
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69.
398
Badoit v. André, Lyon, 18 avril 1856, D.P. [1856] 2. 199; Forissier v. Chaverot,
Req., 10 juin 1902, D.P. [1902] 1. 454; see also Zile, supra note 380, at 299 (discussing
both cases).
399
See Zile, supra note 380, at 299.
392
393
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Similarly, in a modern setting, French neighbors’ rights concern
such resources as access to sunlight, quiet enjoyment, freedom from
noxious smells, and a clean environment.400 These resources, too,
are characteristic of a commons. We all need them to thrive. We all
share in them. And yet, no one person owns them as such. Nor has
even the most totalitarian of governments nationalized or
collectivized the air we breathe.
This understanding of the French law of neighbor’s rights as
maintaining the commons can explain a startling problem in French
law. A judge establishes a violation of neighborhood rights based
on the “abnormal character of the interference.”401 But, as a French
property law hornbook makes clear, “a decision which would
require proof of fault by the author of the interference would be
commit an error of law.”402 How then could conduct be both abusive
and not blameworthy at the same time?
The correlative-rights rationale provides an answer. The “overenjoyment” of a commons, taken to an extreme, threatens the
commons itself. Such over-enjoyment sets the stage for the famous
tragedy of the commons of collective unsustainable use.403 It is
abnormal and abusive in the sense that it is unsustainable.404
And yet, it is precisely what makes the tragedy of the commons
tragic that blaming the participants for their individual overuse of
the commons is as misguided as it is pointless.405 This individual
overuse is an understandable and rational response to structural
incentives to take while something is still available to be taken.406
This response is understandable and not blameworthy because the
abstention of each individual user of the commons alone would only
inflict a double loss on that individual—loss of use of the commons
now relative to other users of the commons and a loss of the
commons later when the unsustainable use by others has finally
driven the commons to extinction.407 The tragedy is structural and
not individual.408

400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408

CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69.
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167.
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167.
Hardin, supra note 222.
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69.
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80.
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 178-80.
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The hornbook distinction between fault and abnormal use in the
French law of neighbor’s rights captures the essence of this tragedy
and seeks to set the structural incentives to avert it.409 It understands
that the conduct by the person is not blameworthy. It nevertheless
maintains that the use of the resource is abusive and abnormal and
as such to be enjoined to protect the commons.410 The commons
rationale thus brings the law back to understanding of a principle of
nuisance as between property and tort/delict, between in personam
and in rem by focusing on the structural consequences of correlative
use of resources.411 The French commons rationale, however, is
more protective than some U.S. jurisdictions, such as Texas, by
allowing a cause of action for conduct, which is abnormal in its
surroundings even if it is not ultra-hazardous.412
Given this functional understanding of French neighbor’s rights,
it should not come as a surprise that French law resembles the
American concept of nuisance law in another, central respect. Its
main remedy, too, is abatement.413 This means that like American
nuisance tort law, it is currently a chief means to provide private law
remedies for pollution.414
It is thus inherently linked to
environmental protection in its modern incarnation in the same way
as nuisance law in America has become.415 Both are means to help
govern the commons.
iii.

Russia

Russian law, as a civil law jurisdiction, follows broadly in the
same legal tradition as French law. It is therefore unsurprising that
Russian law follows broadly a similar starting point to French law
in the use of property: as a matter of “private law, the interests of
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167.
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167.
411
This understanding of neighbor’s rights in French law is currently in the
process of codification. See Casado, supra note 382, at 1011, for an English
translation of the draft text and status of the codification process.
412
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167; Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 60708.
413
11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, TORTS 56 (Andre
Tunc ed. 1981)
414
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167.
415
See Monika Hinteregger, Environmental Liability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Emma Less & Jorge E. Viñuales, eds., 2019).
409
410
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other persons, in particular, neighbors must be taken into
account.”416 The key property law provision in the Code dealing
with a question akin to nuisance is Article 304. It states that “[a]n
owner may demand the elimination of all violation of its rights even
though these violations were not connected with a deprivation of
possession.”417 There is thus a foothold for correlative rights to
develop in Russian Law, as well.
Article 304 of the Russian Civil Code codifies the Roman law
“actio negatoria.”418 This “actio negatoria” is originally a Roman law
cause of action available to an owner of land to force another to cease
and desist from interfering with the owner’s enjoyment of his or her
land.419 Roman law construed such interference with enjoyment as
a servitude imposed upon the land.420 The actio negatoria sought a
declaration of the absence of such a servitude and an injunction
against the offending interference.421 The failure to seek such a
declaration could itself be problematic, as a servitude could be
imposed upon land by prescription (adverse possession).422 As one
recent Roman law text explains, the actio negatoria therefore “served
to defend against claims of servitudes, ‘immissions [sic]’ [i.e., the
commissions of what at common law would be called nuisance or
trespass], and other impairments of ownership.”423 This concept of
actio negatoria is a typical civil law meaning to protect use rights and

416
PETER B. MAGGS, OLGA SCHWARTZ & WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 417, 436 (2015).
417
GRAZHDANSKIĬ KODEKS ROSSIIS̆ KOĬ FEDERATSII [GK FK] [Civil Code] arts. 304
(Russ.) (translated in PETER B. MAGGS, THE CIVIL CODE OF RUSSIA, PARTS 1 AND 2
(2018)).
418
Tikhon Podshivalov, Models of Actio Negatoria in the Law of Russia and
European Countries, 7 RU. L.J. 128, 133 (2019)
419
See W.W. BUCKLAND REVISED BY PETER STEIN, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW
FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 676 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the “need for this
action”).
420
EUGENE PETIT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DU DROIT ROMAIN para. 773 (1906).
421
Id.
422
See Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of Roman Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207, 217
(1925) (discussing permissibility of acquisitive prescription of servitudes in
praetorian law); see also A. N. Yiannopoulos, Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and
Destination of the Owner, 43 LA. L. REV. (1982) (discussing creation of servitudes by
prescription in modern civil law).
423
HERBERT HAUSMANIGER & RICHARD GAMAUF, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN
PROPERTY LAW 205 (George A. Sheets trans. 2012).
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is prevalent in other jurisdictions in Latin America such as Brazil, as
well as many Eastern European jurisdictions.424
Article 304 of the Russian Civil Code has been interpreted in
express comparison to the common law of nuisance.425 This
comparison is functionally apt—nuisance and actio negatoria
regulate the same kind of correlative relationship. It is, however,
formally somewhat problematic because Article 304 of the Russian
Civil Code is structurally more closely related to property law than
it is to delictual liability.426
This formal difference is blunted somewhat in practice. Conduct
that satisfies this requirement of Article 304 further arguably meets
the requirement of quasi-delictual liability in Russian law.
Specifically, Russian law makes available injunctions for potential
or future interferences with the enjoyment of property as part of its
law of delict or tort.427 This tort, too, has been analogized to the
common law of nuisance.428 These requirements meaningfully
overlap with, and inform the property law concept codified in
Article 304 of the Civil Code.429
To succeed on a claim for violation of Article 304, jurisprudence
sets out that the claimant must prove ownership of property.430 This
tracks the French understanding of neighbors’ rights. Both Russian
law and French law formally require that the interference suffered
be a private wrong only.431 That is, in both Russian law and French

424
See Jose Isaac Pilati, Property Law, in INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW at §
5.01 (Fabilan Deffenti & Weiber Barral eds., 2016); see also Podshivalov, supra note
418, passim.
425
See Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 131 (comparing actio negatoria to
English law); see also Stanley R. Boots, Observations from Afield: The Tension Between
the Goals of Russian Environmental Legislation and Extralegal Factors in the Russian Far
East, 10 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 201, 234 (1998) (comparing the Russia legal system to
U.S. environmental law).
426
See GRAZHDANSKIĬ KODEKS ROSSIIS̆ KOĬ FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] arts.
301-304 (Russ.) (providing the immediate context for article 304).
427
CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, RUSSIAN CIVIL CODE TEXT AND ANALYSIS, pts. 1-3, at
215-16 (2008).
428
Id.
429
GRAZHDANSKIĬ KODEKS ROSSIIS̆ KOĬ FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 304
(Russ.) (translated in PETER B. MAGGS, THE CIVIL CODE OF RUSSIA, pts. 1-2 (2018)).
430
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 142 (discussing Novosibirsk Regional Court
Determination of 16 May 2017 in case No. 33-4705/2017).
431
See Asya Ostroukh, Russian Society and its Civil Codes: A Long Way to Civilian
Civil Law, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 373, 393 (2013):
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law, the plaintiff must have standing to bring a lawsuit and allege a
specific harm to a specific piece of property and a specific property
right. Both appear to exclude a public wrong or public nuisance.432
Further, the plaintiff must prove that he or she “does not have
different means to freely use the object belonging to him [or her].”433
The cause of action applies not just to physical intrusions, but also
to deprivations of light and similar environmental harms.434
In addition to these requirements, an action for violation of
Article 304 also takes on elements of delictual liability much like U.S.
nuisance and French neighborhood rights. Specifically, the conduct
at issue in an Article 304 violation must be “wrongful.” As a recent
study explains, the conduct is wrongful if it “is carried out
arbitrarily, without authorization, without a sufficient legal
basis.”435
Importantly, the understanding of wrongfulness here tracks the
French understanding of abnormal use.436 Thus, in Russian law,
wrongfulness does not mean fault or guilt.437 This, too, was a
hallmark of the French neighbors’ rights and its link to the
protection of the enjoyment of the commons.438
The quintessential protection of enjoyment at issue in Russian
sources again indicates a close link to correlative rights. The
Nonetheless, in spite of all these restrictions, it is a private property that
gives to its owner all the rights of possession, enjoinment, and disposition
of property. This right is also protected by all of the means of private
ownership known to civilian legal systems (a true revendicatory
action/actio rei vindicatio and negatory action/actio negatoria). Vladimir
Gsovski is correct in his statement that, “the Soviet law of property shows
also how inescapable private ownership, although in a small dose, is, even
in a socialist State.”
(internal italics omitted) (quoting VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, 2 SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE
RIGHTS AND THEIR BACKGROUND UNDER SOVIET REGIME 567 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch.
Ann Arbor 1949); CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69.
432
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 142 (“[W]hen making a statement of actio
negatoria, the claimant must prove that he has the appropriate right to an
individually-defined object.”); CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167-69.
433
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 143.
434
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 152.
435
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 150.
436
Compare CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389389, at 167 (outlining
French understanding of abnormal use), with Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 143
(outlining the Russian understanding).
437
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 143 (“Actio negatoria will be satisfied only
if the wrongfulness of the actions of a third party is proved, and it does not matter
if this behavior was guilty.”).
438
See infra Section II.
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interference at issue in the Russian law conception of actio negatoria
inherently is an interference with use of property. It is not an action
to quiet title—in fact, it is defined in contradistinction to such an
action.439 Rather, it is an action to enjoin interference with
enjoyment.
The protection of use is a protection of a property right because
“interfering with the ability to extract useful properties from an
object by one’s actions automatically entails difficulty in owning
it.”440 The protection of actio negatoria therefore applies to the overextraction by another of resources shared in the sense of correlative
rights in the same way as the abuse of right rationale did in the
French water law context.441 The actio negatoria seeks to protect the
reasonable use of owners with interests in a shared resource.
Two recent case examples showcase this understanding of
Russian law. The first, Case No. 18AP-10608/2016, concerns the
release of wastewater by a wastewater treatment facility.442 The
facility impaired the use of its property by a neighboring property
owner due to contamination in violation of Russian water law.443
The conduct was enjoined, the nuisance abated—and it was
enjoined to protect the use of the plaintiff’s correlative right to the
shared water supplies. 444 The defendant’s water use threatened the
shared water rights and therefore was to be enjoined.445 Second, the
Russian Supreme Court in 2012 applied a similar understanding to
a more mundane and urban setting:446 the interference with the
enjoyment of common areas in an apartment building.447 The
protection therefore applies to access to commons or shared
resources broadly defined.
In sum, Russian law is broadly consistent with American and
French law. It concerns the protection of correlative rights in
439
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 144-45 (listing the legal characteristics of
actio negatoria).
440
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 147.
441
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 147 (discussing Russian law); see also Badoit
v. André Lyon, 18 avril 1856, D.P. [1856] 2. 199 (Fr.); Forissier v. Chaverot, Req., 10 juin
1902, D.P. [1902] 1. 454 (Fr.); Zile, supra note 380, at 299 (discussing both French
cases).
442
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155.
443
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155.
444
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155.
445
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 155.
446
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 153 (discussing the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation of 17 February 2015 in case No. 302-ES14-1496).
447
Podshivalov, supra note 418, at 153.
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commons. Russian law polices the use of the common pooled
resource against interferences with correlative rights. It polices the
use not by reference to the concept of fault. Rather, it looks to a
concept of wrongfulness that, like the French concept of abnormal
use, is concerned with the sustainable use of resources.
iv.

People’s Republic of China

Chinese law similarly recognizes a private right of action for
nuisance. In principle, non-trivial interferences with a property
right can give right to a suit in nuisance.448 This principle has since
been expanded and further defined in a concept of statutory
nuisance. As Professor Guiguo Wang explains, first attempts at
codifying statutory nuisance was intended as a “bridge between the
common law and regulations.”449 Professor Wang notes that
“[s]tatutory nuisance was created to allow for a speedy and efficient
way to abate nuisances without resorting to [the] complex”
regulatory procedures.450 Chinese law has since undergone further
reform.
The currently most analogous provisions in Chinese law to
nuisance are Articles 65-68 of the 2010 Chinese Tort Law.451 Article
65 follows the general polluter-pays principle.452 It sets out that if a
person suffering from pollution can show that they were harmed
and that the harm was caused by the pollution, the person who
caused the pollution will be liable to the victim.453
Once a party has discharged its burden under Article 65, Article
66 imposes the burdens of persuasion onto the polluter to show that
their activity did not constitute pollution.454 Further, Article 66
allows the polluter to claim for mitigation or to provide evidence to
THE CHINA LAW SERIES, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA: MARKET ECONOMY
414 (GUIGUO WANG & Wei Zhenying eds., 1996).
449
Id. at 420.
450
Id.
451
Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó qīnquán zérèn fǎ (中华人民共和国侵权责任
法) [Tort Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) arts. 65-68 (China),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn136en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WZL6-6XT7] (WIPO, trans.).
452
Id. at art. 65.
453
Id. at art. 66.
454
Id.
448

AND LAW
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call into question the plaintiff’s causation case.455 The remaining two
articles of Chapter VII on environmental pollution further set out a
modified regime of joint and several liability.456
This new 2010 regime has been likened to private nuisance.457 It
tracks some of the features of French and Russian law and a majority
of U.S. jurisdictions. Specifically, the 2010 Tort Law creates a nofault regime.458 This no-fault regime, however, does not outright
define what constitutes “pollution.”459 It thus does not identify
clearly whether the pollution in question means any emissions or
interferences or only abnormal emissions or spills. It also does not
list what kind of interferences will be considered pollution.
The question as to what pollution is covered by the 2010 regime
can meaningfully be informed by the broader public interest
environmental lawsuits now available under Chinese law.460 This
broader Chinese law framework permits lawsuits not just by
persons directly harmed by pollution, as the 2010 Tort Law would.461
It removes this standing requirement and allows public interest
groups to bring actions for environmental harm in the courts.462
The definition of pollution operating under this broader
framework, as Professor Benoit Mayer and Richard Zhang explain,
allows public interest litigation “to target not only conduct which
pollutes the human environment, but also actions that cause
ecological damage.”463 A systemic interpretation of Chinese law as
a whole would suggest that the term “pollution” in the 2010 Tort
Law follows this broader concern with pollution and would allow
suit for any unreasonable environmental degradation.464
This link again recalls the relationship between nuisance and
commons governance. The use of common pooled resources by one
party unreasonably impairs the use of the same resource by others.
Id.
Id. at arts. 67-68.
457
Carissa Wong, Director Duty of Care in China and the United States: What
Liability for Climate Change?, 18 VT. J. ENV’T. L. 287, 301-02 (2016).
458
Id. at 302-03.
459
Tort Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 451.
460
See Richard Zhang & Benoit Mayer, Public Interest Environmental Litigation
in China, 1 CHI. J. ENVTL. L. 202 (2017) (discussing public interest environmental
litigation in China).
461
Tort Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 451 at ch.II.
462
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 203.
463
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217.
464
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-18.
455
456
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Both the 2010 Tort Law and the broader statutory framework of
which it forms part appear aimed at righting this commons problem
and provide a remedy and a means to gain access to justice for those
negatively affected by over-exploitation.465
The link between tort law and commons is the more pronounced
in the Chinese setting. The public interest portion of Chinese
environmental protection litigation is rooted in a conception of an
“ecological civilization.”466 This ecological civilization protects the
commons by providing a “sound working and living
environment.”467 This is a classical commons concern at the core of
the American, French, and Russian conceptions of nuisance.
Moreover, the Chinese conception also covers cultural
commons.468 The environmental law framework is available in
order to protect cultural relics against deterioration.469 This again
creates a strong link between heritage, commons protection, and
Chinese tort law in this broader setting.
There are, however, notable differences between Chinese law
and the other legal systems studied so far. Most significantly, the
other legal systems studied so far have located nuisance principles
at the intersection between property and tort law.470 They have
focused on the flipsides of use and interference through use through
this lens of positive property rights to utilize one’s property and
negative property rights to exclude others from interfering in one’s
own property rights.471
Chinese law does not locate the concern with commons
protection at this intersection of property and tort law. Rather,
Chinese law places this concern at the intersection of tort and
administrative law.472
This suggests a completely different
theoretical approach to the problem of commons governance than
nuisance law would suggest.

Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-18.
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 209; Sun Qian & Jack Tuholske, An
Exploration of and Reflection on China’s System of Environmental Public Interest
Litigation, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10497, 10501-02 (2017).
467
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 209; see also Sun & Tuholske, supra note
466.
468
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 218.
469
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 218.
470
See infra Sections I-III.
471
See infra Sections I-III.
472
See Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460.
465
466
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This difference does not, however, undercut the core
commonalities of a nuisance principle established so far. Thus, the
regime still places a premium on policing the use of shared resources
(the environmental and cultural heritage).473 It does not approach
the question of permissibility or impermissibility through the lens
of fault.474 Even more starkly than the other approaches investigated
so far, Chinese law looks to sustainability as the main goal post of
commons governance. 475
Perhaps most surprisingly, Chinese law in this broader legal
infrastructure places governance of the commons in the hands of
multiple actors. It does not rely upon a regulatory approach.
Rather, it relies upon a combination of private and governmental
mechanisms to govern the commons.476 This combination consists
of private rights to participation in the commons with public
enforcement mechanisms for the protection of these rights.477 These
public enforcement mechanisms, however, remain split between
state-driven supervision through the administrative process and
private enforcement through tort and public interest litigation.
v.

Israel

Israel is a mixed jurisdiction, inhabiting a place between the civil
and (English) common law. The main instrument governing tort
law in Israel, the Civil Wrongs Ordinance of 1944, is English in
origin.478 The Civil Wrongs Ordinance “constitutes a sort of
Restatement of the common law of torts, as it stood during the 1930’s
and 1940’s.”479 This Ordinance, as updated, continues to provide the
foundation for tort law in Israel.480
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-18; Sun & Tuholske, supra note 466.
Wong, supra note 457.
475
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-18; Sun & Tuholske, supra note 466.
476
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-19.
477
Zhang & Mayer, supra note 460, at 217-19.
478
Aharon Barak, The Codification of the Civil Law and the Law of Torts, 24 ISR. L.
REV. 628, 639 (1990).
479
Id.
480
Civil
Wrongs
Ordinance,
5712-1968,
LSI
10
266
(Isr.),
https://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/tort-ordinance-new-version-updated-tomarch-2015/ [https://perma.cc/WXX6-XVCZ]. In addition to the tort of nuisance,
Israeli law also has a criminal nuisance statute. This section deals with the private
473
474
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The Civil Wrongs Ordinance contains a section on nuisance.
Given its common law origin, it unsurprisingly distinguishes
between public nuisance and private nuisance. It codifies the law of
public nuisance in sections 42 and 43.481 It codifies the law of private
nuisance in sections 44 to 46.482 It defines a public nuisance as “some
unlawful act, or omission to discharge a legal duty, where such act
or omission endangers the life, safety, health, property or comfort of
the public or obstructs the public in the exercise of some common
right.”483 It requires an individual to have standing to bring an
action of public nuisance.484
The Civil Wrongs Ordinance defines private nuisance as
conduct or use of immovable property so “as materially to interfere
with the reasonable use and enjoyment, having regard to the
situation and nature thereof, of the immovable property of any other
person.”485 The Civil Wrongs Ordinance further codifies defenses,
establishing that consent is a defense to nuisance whereas moving
to the nuisance is not.486
Like the other legal systems studied, Israeli law used private
nuisance as a means to provide private redress for pollution. One
of the earliest cases using the nuisance section of the British-mandate
Ordinance was Sick Fund of the General Federation of Jewish Labour in
Palestine v. Taasiya Chemith.487 The case concerned the emission of
gases from a chemical plant.488 These emissions ended up in a
hospital, causing dizziness and headaches in its patients.489 The Tel
Aviv District Court found that the emission constituted a
nuisance.490

law statute. For a discussion on the relationship between the two, see Rachelle
Adam, Government Failure and Public Indifference: A Portrait of Water Pollution in
Israel, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 257, 311-12 (2000).
481
Tort Ordinance, 5712-1968, §§ 42-43 LSI 10 266 (Mar. 2015) (as amended)
(Isr.),
https://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/tort-ordinance-new-versionupdated-to-march-2015/ [https://perma.cc/WXX6-XVCZ].
482
Id. at §§ 44-46.
483
Id. at § 42.
484
Id. at § 43.
485
Id. at § 44(a).
486
Id. at §§ 45-46.
487
Zeev Negbi, The Prevention of Nuisances in Israel, 11 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 822,
826 (1962).
488
Id.
489
Id.
490
Id.
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The perhaps paradigmatic cases for such a use of private
nuisance in Israeli jurisprudence is Ata Textile Co. Ltd. v. Schwartz.491
The case involved an aggrieved homeowner, Mr. Schwartz. 492 Mr.
Schwartz lived on the edge of a residentially zoned area abutting an
industrial area.493 Mr. Schwartz had the misfortune to have Israel’s
largest textile factory belonging to Ata Textile Co. Ltd. for a
neighbor.494 Ata had installed cooling equipment essential to its
production methods in its factory.495 Unfortunately, first for Mr.
Schwartz and then for Ata, the equipment “caused tremendous
noise in Mr. Schwartz’s home.”496 Mr. Schwartz took Ata to court
and sought an injunction to make it stop.497
The case is paradigmatic for nuisance law because it allowed for
the issuance of an injunction enjoining the nuisance even though the
hardship of the injunction to the defendant was greater than the
harm of the original nuisance to the plaintiff. In other words,
nuisance law is not only a means to receive compensation.498 It
creates a positive duty to cease and desist from creating a nuisance.
The case is interesting in another regard. There is no sense in
which Ata’s conduct could have been culpable or even negligent.
Ata did not install the equipment in order to harm Mr. Schwartz. 499
Ata installed cooling equipment that was appropriate for its own
purposes and apparently did so in a manner consistent with
industry standards, or at the very least in a manner that would have
satisfied an economic analysis of relative benefits and harms.500 Mr.
Schwartz’s expectation of quiet was a reasonable use and enjoyment
of his house,501 and the level of noise generated by Ata’s cooling
491
CivA 44/76 Ata Textile Company Ltd. v. Schwartz, 30(iii) P.D. 785 (1976)
(Isr.). See Barak, supra note 478, at 642 n90 (discussing the paradigmatic nature of
the case); Perry, infra note 498; Adv. A. Amos Fried, A brief review of the law of
nuisance,
JANGLO
(November
11,
2018)
https://www.janglo.net/item/9nVdowOCukq [https://perma.cc/ZRM5-AJSG].
492
David Kretzmer, Judicial Conservativism v. Economic Liberalism: Anatomy of a
Nuisance Case, 3 ISR. L. REV. 298, 304 (1978).
493
Id.
494
Id.
495
Id.
496
Id. at 304-05.
497
Id. at 305.
498
Ronen Perry, Law of Torts, in THE ISRAELI LEGAL SYSTEM 87, 109 (Christian
Walter et al. eds., 2019).
499
Kretzmer, supra note 492, at 304-06.
500
Kretzmer, supra note 492, at 304-06; Perry, supra note 498, at 88-89.
501
Perry, supra note 498, at 88-89.
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equipment substantially interfered with it.502 The case therefore
illustrates that the understanding in Israeli law of a substantial
interference with reasonable use and enjoyment is consistent with
the civil law understanding of neighbor’s rights or the actio negatoria:
it operates without fault but with regard to the reasonableness of use
seen from the perspective of the commons.503
Both features of nuisance law are consistent with the function of
nuisance laws outlined above to protect the commons against overuse and interference with correlative rights. In Schwartz, this
common resource was the quiet enjoyment of a residential
environment, pun intended.504 Any student who was unexpectedly
exposed to noise while studying for a law school exam can
personally confirm that quiet is a resource. The problem is, as the
same student may also painfully recall, it is a common pooled
resource. A room is only quiet when all are silent. It was to protect
this common pooled resource of “quiet” that the court issued an
injunction—even though the injunction was not economically
advantageous. That is to say, the Court protected the commons
from tragedy by allowing Mr. Schwartz to prevent the “over-use” of
the noise threshold in the neighborhood through a nuisance
action.505
One should not misunderstand the result in Schwartz as an
absolute injunction against use of commons whenever such use
interferes with interest of a neighbor. To the contrary, the Israeli
Supreme Court in the earlier decision in Azari v. Victor Klein
explained that the test is one of mutuality, reciprocity, and
reasonableness.506 In terms of the commons, each member of the
relevant community of interests has correlative rights to reasonable
access to the commons. Any insistence by one member of the
community that would render the commons useless to the others
would in Israeli terms be unreasonable and lacking in mutuality.507
In French civil law terms, it would amount to an abuse of right.508 In
Perry, supra note 498, at 88-89.
See infra Sections V(b)(ii)-(iii); see also Civil Wrongs Ordinance, supra note
481, at § 44(a). See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Do the Right Thing: Indirect
Remedies in Private Law, 94 BOS. U. L. REV. 55, 93 n.199 (2014) (discussing that
nuisance is between strict and fault-based liability).
504
See Kretzmer, supra note 492, at 304-05.
505
Perry, supra note 498, at 109-10.
506
See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828.
507
See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828.
508
See infra Section V(b)(ii).
502

503
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short, the nuisance principle is one that applies to the use of
commons in context and in the interaction between its users and
thus takes into account the plurality of interests and uses involved.
This feature of nuisance therefore leaves a significant autonomy
with the users of the commons. Mutuality and reciprocity are
concepts that assume communication and an attempt at reasonable
self-regulation of the commons.509 The law of nuisance superimposes oversight over these self-regulatory processes to secure
both the enforceability of reasonable reliance interests of
participants and an appropriate incentive structure to avoid
recourse to the courts as a means of last resort—a recourse that
might end in an all-or-nothing injunction ex post rather than
accommodation between the parties as to how use might be
curtailed in a reasonable manner.
Despite some practical divergence of public nuisance law in
Israel,510 the key principle of nuisance in Israeli law largely tracks
the principle of nuisance law and correlative rights as it has been
developed on the basis of American, French, Russian, and Chinese
law. Israeli law confirms the purpose of nuisance law to protect
commons by focusing on the relative uses of the commons.
Nuisance law protects the commons while leaving significant
flexibility to the users of the commons to determine their own rules
for access and use of the commons. It thus does not impose an
absolute or hard rule of nuisance, but rather looks to a principle of
nuisance to support the development of an equilibrium by and
between commons users.
vi.

Shari’a

Shari’a similarly richly incorporates the principle of protecting
the commons. The relationship between humans and creation is one
cornerstone for protecting the commons. Shari’a places humans in a
position of stewardship.511 This stewardship entails the obligation
509
See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828; ELINOR OSTROM, THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMONS 79-80 (2012) (discussing the importance of asking questions and building
trust and growing social capital by doing so).
510
See Orit Marom-Albeck & Alon Tal, Upgrading Citizen Suits as a Tool for
Environmental Enforcement in Israel: A Comparative Evaluation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 373, 400401 (2000).
511
Ali Ahmad, Islamic Water Law as an Antidote for Maintaining Water Quality,
2 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 169, 178-9 (1999).
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to protect and care for the environment, in other words, creation.512
In principle, this obligation is not focused exclusively on human
flourishing.513 It extends to the protection of nature as a whole in its
own right.514
This obligation is put expressly in terms of the commons. As one
scholar puts it, “misuse might result in unjustly depriving future
generations of the ability to benefit from them, and thus would also
contradict the teachings of the True Faith and the stewardship of
Man on Earth.”515 This rationale tracks closely the rationale of the
tragedy of the commons to enjoin overuse so as to prevent the
collapse of the commons.516
Shari’a fully internalizes this rationale. In a metaphor that is
meaningful for current purposes, “[i]n the Islamic perspective,
people in a community can be compared to passengers on a ship.” 517
This life imposes “a common responsibility”518—and thus creates
correlative rights. This responsibility means that “[e]ach passenger
has to ensure the ship’s safeguard not only for his own safety but
that of others as well.”519 To disrupt the environment consequently
“contradicts the principle that one should not cause environmental
harm (embodied in Islamic Law (Shari’a)).”520 This principle again
is broader than maintaining natural resource for future, human
exploitation: “[e]xcessive exploitation of the environment driven by
insatiable consumerism, individual economic gain, or limitless
development, is hardly consistent with the trusteeship of
humankind over all other matters.”521
This principle is further expressed in a manner reasonably close
to the French concept of neighbor’s rights discussed above.522 The
Quran requires that one do good to “the near neighbor[s], the

512
Omar A. Bakhashab, Islamic Law and the Environment: Some Basic Principles,
3 ARAB L.Q. 287, 287-8 (1998).
513
Ahmad, supra note 511, at 178.
514
Ahmad, supra note 511, at 178.
515
Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289.
516
See Hardin, supra note 215, at 1244-45.
517
Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289.
518
Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289.
519
Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289.
520
Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 290.
521
Ahmad, supra note 511, at 179.
522
See infra Section V(b)(ii).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/2

2021]

Cyber-Nuisance

1077

neighbor farther away.”523 This duty forms part of Shari’a.524 This
principle is close in expression to the requirement to act with due
regard for one’s neighbor and neighborhood usage underlying
French neighbor’s rights.525 If anything, Shari’a extends this
obligation further than French law because it covers neighbors near
and far.526 Further, it requires more expressly that the conduct of
one not destroy the rights of use of another even if such use were
otherwise consistent with community practice.527
This principle of Shari’a found expression in a manner very close
to contemporary understandings of nuisance in the Medjellè, the
Ottoman civil code.
The Medjellè “prohibited [the] serious
hinderance [sic] of those living in neighboring buildings, inter alia,
byexcessive [sic] smoke or odour from a furnace or manufactory of
linseed.”528
In the land use context, too, Shari’a remains largely consistent
with the understanding of nuisance developed above. In this
context, too, “a person may undertake any kind of activity on his
land to the extent that he does not degrade it or expose any beings,
human or non-human, to danger.”529 Land use is circumscribed by
obligations to warn and obligations to pay damages for lawfully
conducted ultra-hazardous activities.530 But again, these activities
must be conducted in the context of neighbor’s rights as outlined,
for example, in the Medjellè.531
This obligation grows more stringent the more essential the
commons affected by human conduct. For example, the obligation

523
Quran,
Surah
Ah-Nisa
4:36,
QURAN.COM,
https://quran.com/4/36?translations=27,22,21,20,95,19,18,17,101,34
[https://perma.cc/YP6D-UKF5] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
524
Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 290.
525
Compare Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 290 (requiring one to take regard for
one’s neighbors), with CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167 (requiring as a
matter of French law that activities not be unduly impairing the enjoyment of one’s
neighbor’s rights).
526
Quran, supra note 523.
527
Bakhashab, supra note 512, at 289.
528
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS, TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION:
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CO-OPERATION OF STATES vii (Cees Flinterman
et al. eds., 1986).
529
Ahmad, supra note 511, at 180.
530
Umar F. Moghul & Samir H.K. Safar-Aly, Green Sukuk: The Introduction of
Islam’s Environmental Ethics to Contemporary Islamic Finance, 27 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L.
REV. 1, 15-16 (2014).
531
See TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION, supra note 514.
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“is more pronounced in the case of water.”532 The justification for
this heightened standard is expressly commons-based—water is
different because it “is a resource held in common by society.”533
This common ownership, and community right to water use, was
also codified in the Ottoman Medjellè.534
Interestingly, the shari’a approach, too, rejects absolutism.
Centrally, Islamic “[j]urists endeavored to balance strong individual
rights against collective community rights including non-human
components of nature, and to remain within the parameters of the
intent and objectives of The Lawgiver.”535 It thus embeds the
concept of nuisance in the relationships between users of commons
and the commons itself. This again demonstrates a contextual
approach, taking into account the autonomy of different actors in
shaping how environmental nuisance principles are actually
applied and the manner in which correlative rights are protected.
c. Applying Nuisance to the Cyber Context
The nuisance principle developed in the previous section
functions to protect the rights of all participants in a commons
against substantial interference with their enjoyment of the
commons. It does so by treating the participants in the commons as
correlative rights holders. These correlative rights secure that all
participants in a commons maintain the commons and that none
substantially interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the
commons by others. As such, nuisance promises to be a principle
that can guide legal decision making in the cyber context. This
section outlines how cyber nuisance would improve upon the blind
spots in Tallinn 2.0 addressed above in key respects.

532
533
534
535

Ahmad, supra note 511, at 180.
Ahmad, supra note 511, at 180.
Moghul & Safar-Aly, supra note 530, at 16.
Moghul & Safar-Aly, supra note 530, at 14.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/2

2021]
i.

Cyber-Nuisance

1079

Debugging the Fault Trap

One of the key problems bedeviling Tallinn 2.0 was its insistence
upon fault.536 Tallinn 2.0 follows a responsibility paradigm.537 Thus,
logically, it must also follow a full-blown fault paradigm. This led
to significant governance issues, particularly as a fault paradigm did
not provide for any realistic means to improve governance.
Cyber-nuisance changes the equation. It treats cyber as a
commons. It therefore treats all participants in cyber as holding
correlative rights to cyberspace.538 These correlative rights require
the maintenance of the resource as to which multiple parties hold
correlative rights, which in the case of the current inquiry is
cyberspace.539 At times, this means one will need to help defray the
costs of additional efforts by others to maintain the commons.540
Consistent with climate finance approaches to the climate commons,
it thus provides a means of cyber-finance to stand alongside cybernuisance.541 That is, cyber nuisance does not leave actors unable to
shoulder the financial burden of upkeep out on their own.
Correlative rights further require that one not use cyberspace in
a manner that is fundamentally inconsistent with its use and
enjoyment by others. Hacks, malware, and similar intrusions are
inherently suspect—such intrusions typically interfere with the
privacy rights of participants and, as such, are internationally
unlawful in their own right.542 Cyber-nuisance adds an additional
layer of protection by requiring correlative rights holders to
diligently prevent conditions making such hacking more likely.
But the dissemination of content, too, can create a nuisance.
Cyberbullying and cyberstalking are illustrative examples of
conduct that can—in the right circumstances—be akin to the

See infra Section I.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 84 r. 14.
538
Pierce, supra note 36 (discussing the concept of correlative rights in relation
to property in oil and gas and in other contemporary issues).
539
Pierce, supra note 36.
540
Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
541
See generally ALEXANDER ZAHAR, CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017) (analyzing climate finance obligations of developed and
developing countries).
542
See generally Sourgens, Privacy, supra note 290 (delineating a balancing test
between reasonable expectations of privacy and the proportionality of the means
used to intrude).
536
537

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1080

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:4

creation of, say, noise nuisances.543 This means that cyber-nuisance
does require policing of content beyond prohibiting intrusions
through hacks.
Importantly, cyber-nuisance does not grant any cyber
participant a veto right over others any more than nuisance gives
people a veto right over their neighbor’s conduct at home. If the
point of cyber is connectivity, then there is a right to connect and
exchange. This right entails that others may say things we find
deeply offensive.544 By analogy, cyber-nuisance addresses this
concern by requiring a balancing of the respective rights of each
participant.545 It errs on the side of expression and only enjoins the
substantial interference with the rights of others to use cyberspace
that is, the balance must substantially favor intervention.546
In many instances, conduct is clearly a nuisance, and as such,
requires abatement. The dissemination of revenge pornography is

543
See Melissa Anne Springer, Warning! Speak at Your Own Risk: First
Amendment Restrictions on Off-Campus Physical, Emotional, or Cyberbullying, 86 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (2018) (categorizing cyber conduct as a nuisance in ordinary
language terms); Maureen E. Brady, Property and Projection, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1143,
1194-95 (2020) (discussing projecting images as nuisance when done with malicious
intent and substantially interfering with the property right). Social media accounts
are property. In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). As such, they
are meaningfully analogous in important respects to the facades at issue in
Professor Brady’s article. This means that the ordinary language use of “nuisance”
in the cyber context is in fact on to something. Cyber-bullying on social media
accounts is an interference with a property interest. To the extent that it is
substantial and unreasonable—and in fact malicious, per Professor Brady’s
discussion—the notion that it constitutes a nuisance is no longer far-fetched.
544
In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 371 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) (discussing the
importance of connectivity and visibility in categorizing social media accounts as
property); see also Brady, supra note 542, at 1202-13 (discussing the First Amendment
implications of projections torts cases).
545
See Springer, supra note 542, at 863; Brady, supra note 543, at 1202-13
(discussing the First Amendment implications of projections torts cases). The
argument here is one of analogy.
546
Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 605 (Tex. 2016).
The Crosstex case concerns interference with land. As discussed above in footnote
542, the substantial interference with a property interest is reasonably analogous to
the substantial interference with a property interest in land. Particularly, the
projection of images onto a house or business is in fact reasonably analogous to
projecting on to a social media page in that it seeks to tag the person or business in
a highly visible and identifiable manner. It is therefore reasonable to extend the
nuisance logic here as well once the nature of social media as property takes further
hold. I will develop this thought further in a future article.
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one such instance.547 Similarly, it is almost inherent in the name that
the use of “troll farms” to amplify misinformation campaigns is a
nuisance.548 Troll farms amplify online noise to harm their target in
the same way as the installation of industrial equipment in a
residential neighborhood would. But the pendulum similarly
swings in the other direction when it comes to the right of
individuals to engage in conspiratorial discourse—even to trade in
misinformation to make a political point. Free expression on the
internet defies a truth police.
This shift away from a responsibility or fault paradigm has
consequences for remedies, as well. The only listed potential selfhelp remedy for a nuisance is abatement. Self-help logically is
similarly limited to the abatement logic.549 The appropriate
countermeasures (that is, self-help in the international context) for
the failure of a State to respect correlative rights is also abatement.
It is not a general countermeasure. It is a countermeasure that itself
conserves the commons.
How then would cyber-nuisance treat the problems identified in
Section II differently? The legal risk assessment of countering a
potential outbreak of Emotet in Frankfurt illustrates the fault trap of
Tallinn 2.0.550 Tallinn 2.0 created a negative incentive against
preventing an outbreak.551
Cyber-nuisance creates the opposite incentive. First, correlative
right holders have an overriding obligation to maintain the
commons to the best of their ability. This includes an obligation to
take reasonable preventive measures to render safe their portion of

547
See generally Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First
Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661 (2016) (discussing freedom of expression
and revenge pornography balancing in the First Amendment context).
548
See generally Aja Romano, Twitter released 9 million tweets from one Russian
troll
farm.
Here’s
what
we
learned,
VOX
(Oct.
19,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/19/17990946/twitter-russian-trolls-botselection-tampering [https://perma.cc/GV43-PR3E] (reporting about the fake
tweets created by a trollfarm in Russia during the 2016 U.S. election).
549
See Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610 ("It is well-settled that three different
remedies are potentially available to a claimant who prevails on a private-nuisance
claim: damages, injunctive relief, and self-help abatement”).
550
See Cimpanu, supra note 207.
551
See infra Section III(c).
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the commons.552 The starting position therefore is different as
Tallinn 2.0 did not include such an obligation of prevention.553
Taking preventive measures in the cyber-nuisance context also
helps to govern up. As discussed in the previous section, the
nuisance principle is governed largely by neighborhood standards.
Obligations are mutual.554 This means that to benefit from greater
efforts by others to maintain the commons, one therefore would be
well-advised to lead by example and improve the commons. Such
leading by example will not inure to one’s detriment as one only is
obligated to act as the neighborhood acts. Thus, if others fail to
follow the lead, one should remain free to step back without falling
below the threshold of neighborhood standards.555 But if one
succeeds, one benefits from the significantly increased cyber
commons in much the same way as commons participants do in the
water context—the improvement is exponential.
Cyber-nuisance thus lends itself to trust building. It allows
neighbors to step up their respective efforts to improve the
neighborhood. This effort creates a visible lift for others to follow
suit. As a neighborhood principle, it further provides a greater
incentive for networks to form in order to create better means to
protect cyber and monitor and communicate about these efforts.
ii.

The Attribution Shield

Cyber nuisance also helps to avoid the problems posed by the
attribution for Tallinn 2.0. Briefly, the attribution problem meant
that one had to prove that conduct in fact was perpetrated by an
organ of state or that the state in fact had effective control over a
cyber-operation.556 This led to practical problems of proof that could
easily become insurmountable.557
Cyber-nuisance shields from the attribution problem. It imposes
an obligation on the State not to interfere substantially with the quiet
552
Derosne v. Puzin, D.P. [1845] I. 13, 14-15 (Fr.); see Zile, supra note 380, at
294-98 (translating and analyzing the relevant positions of the Derosne v. Puzin in
English.).
553
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 43-44 r. 7 ¶¶ 7-8.
554
See Negbi, supra note 487, at 828.
555
CHAMOULAUD-TRAPIERS, supra note 389, at 167.
556
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 87, 94 rr. 15 & 17.
557
See infra Section II.
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enjoyment of others. The threshold for this obligation is lower than
the attribution threshold for conduct the State supports, whether
directly or indirectly. Further, this obligation also entails an
obligation to harden infrastructure so as to make it more difficult for
third parties to use State capabilities to further a cyber-operation by
third parties.
The first problem concerned attributing the hack of South
Korean banks as well as Sony to North Korea. As discussed above,
it is not entirely clear whether the initial identification of North
Korea as the culprit in these attacks was premised upon sufficient
evidence.558 A cyber-nuisance paradigm would sidestep this
problem. It would instead require efforts by North Korea to avoid
incursion into its cyber network. Notably, North Korea would not
have to achieve this end alone. Rather, those interested in requiring
North Korea to avoid future abuse of its cyber infrastructure under
a cyber-nuisance approach may well be asked to help pay for the
upgrade.559 But to the extent that North Korea’s infrastructure is
below the threshold of other similarly situated actors, cyber
nuisance can require that its infrastructure be further improved.
The second problem discussed above concerned “patriotic
hackers.”560 Patriotic hackers presented a problem for Tallinn 2.0 as
they are not state organs and are not under the effective control of
the State. Cyber nuisance would impose multiple obligations on the
State, each of which would likely make patriotic hackers a less
palatable scenario for cyber operations.
First, the State could very well be made liable for “arming” or
supporting patriotic hackers. It is reasonably clear even under an
intentional nuisance view that the kind of support given to such
Brian Todd & Ben Brumfield, supra note 173.
Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
The Spur Industries case is one of the leading cases for this type of remedial approach
in U.S. law. See Osborne M. Reynolds Jr., Of Time and Feedlots: The Effect of Spur
Industries on Nuisance Law, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 75 (1992). This
remedial logic applies by analogy to the international setting if we follow a nuisance
logic. In the international setting, such an approach is already in ascendency in the
context of another area of law that is frequently associated with commons
governance—namely, climate in the context of climate finance obligations to
support carbon mitigation efforts by developing countries. See ZAHAR, supra note
541 (discussing climate finance); Scott J. Shackelford, The Future of Frontiers, 23
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1331, 1372-74 (2020) (discussing climate change and cyber
from a commons governance perspective); Frederic G. Sourgens, A Parisian
Consensus, 60 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming, 2021) (discussing climate
change from an energy commons governance perspective).
560
Calamur, supra note 185.
558
559
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groups would make it materially likely that harm will befall
somebody whom the patriotic hacker believes to represent a threat
to the fatherland.561 To support such persons in their endeavors
therefore would not be consistent with the cyber nuisance paradigm.
Second, if the State is made responsible for the interference with
the rights of third parties by actors it cannot effectively control, it is
all the more likely that the State will wish to bring such capabilities
in house. Such a move would be prudent if only to have greater
operational control. And control now is no longer a hallmark for
fault trigger.
At the same time, the standard remains heavily contextual. A
State therefore only has cause to complain about the conduct of
another if it is not itself engaged in the same kind of activity. The
more espionage and other activities States conduct, the less credible
a claim for cyber-nuisance by such a State becomes. Given the cyber
operations loosely said to be affiliated with most (even regional)
powers, cyber-nuisance would require mutual cyber disarmament
before any claim would lie for violation of one’s correlative rights.
An abuser of rights cannot complain of abuse of rights.
The attribution shield is the first step in removing an obstacle to
good commons governance. This obstacle is the incentive structure
of a hierarchically privileged State able to provide rewards to those
unaffiliated with it to achieve certain goals no matter the collateral
damage.562 This incentive structure is indicative of failed commons
governance mechanisms and is a kind of polycentricity of decay.563
It erodes trust and creates incentives to emulate destructive
behaviors. And yet, the erosion of trust is diffuse and networked
between realpolitik-driven State actors and their collaborators.
Removing this shield is therefore instrumental in securing a longterm sustainable governance process.

561
Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 605 (Tex. 2016).
Again, the reference to Crosstex is intended by analogy as Crosstex is a sophisticated
articulation of nuisance law principles – principles which this Article has argued in
fact enjoy the status of a general principle of law. The logic of that principle
therefore should be applicable – by analogy – in the international setting.
562
See generally OSTROM, supra note 32, at 157-73 (illustrating irrigation
development projects in Sri Lanka).
563
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 157-73.
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Polycentric Connectivity

The final problem for Tallinn 2.0 highlighted in the first section
was its State-centered approach and the loss of core non-State
stakeholders in cyber governance. Tallinn 2.0 is adamant that it
applies only to State conduct.564 It further did not provide a
seamless, nestled governance structure by allowing States to not
preventively regulate, to not harden their cyber infrastructure, and
to not monitor cyber conduct in their respective jurisdictions.565
Cyber-nuisance changes this approach to cyber-governance
radically. Cyber-nuisance requires States to respect the correlative
rights of all participants in cyberspace. Cyber-nuisance takes States
to task to use their regulatory power to bring about this result and
thus imposes a regulatory obligation on the State preventively to
regulate, harden cyber infrastructure, and monitor cyber conduct in
a manner consistent with the overall neighborhood standards in the
relevant portion of cyberspace.
Furthermore, cyber-nuisance takes into account the input from
non-State actors as very real parts of the obligations involved. The
cyber neighborhood is not just the State-owned infrastructure. It
includes cyberspace as a whole. The standard of conduct of private
actors in cyber therefore are an integral part of setting neighborhood
expectations. Thus, if the private actors in cyber collectively raise
the standard of cyber protection, the State would in principle be
required to follow suit under a nuisance logic. The far more likely
outcome, however, is that these actors will interconnect and
exchange on governance and thus share in respective governance
responsibilities under a cyber-nuisance paradigm.
Moreover, the discussion above on regulating cyber speech
already suggests that the appropriate balancing will not depend
upon state actors alone. If posts on Twitter or Facebook constituted
a cyber-nuisance, it would require Twitter or Facebook to assist in
regulating this conduct, for instance, by taking down the posts.566
Twitter and Facebook presumably will respond to regulatory
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 17 r. 4.
See infra Section III(a).
566
See generally Jessica Guynn, These are Facebook’s secret rules for removing posts,
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
24,
2018,
2:24
PM
ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/04/24/facebook-disclosessecret-guidelines-policing-content-introduces-appeals/544046002/
[https://perma.cc/X9XK-CGYD] (describing the rules and guidelines on
permissible and impermissible posts that Facebook published in 2018).
564
565
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pressures to do so. They will also respond to market pressures to do
so.567 But in the final analysis, the abatement of the nuisance—and
the setting of the first line of standards to avoid nuisances—will lie
with apex platforms.
This point is sadly no longer exclusively academic. Following
the attack on the U.S. Capitol by supporters of then-President
Trump on January 6, 2020, social media platforms such as Twitter
did the previously unthinkable—they “de-platformed” the
President of the United States; that is, they terminated his ability to
post to the network.568 Other actors, such as Amazon, then cut off
the ability of other platforms, like Parler, to operate. 569 These
actions—by private companies arguably in keeping with their
respective terms of use—represent a very tangible attempt to abate
a cyber-nuisance: to shut off the use of cyberspace as a means to
plan violent attacks on lawmakers and government institutions
ahead of the inauguration of President Biden.570
The cyber-nuisance perspective allows a different lens through
which to assess the actions of social media platforms. This lens
would suggest that as long as there is a real threat, premised in
actionable intelligence, that cyber platforms are indeed used to plot
violence, the abatement logic suggests even such drastic action. The
fact that private actors do in fact take such action thus is consistent
with a cyber-nuisance paradigm.
At the same time, the cyber-nuisance paradigm suggests that
there must be clear limits to such de-platforming. Consider the
military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021. The New York Times
reported that “[m]obile networks and the internet were
intermittently down in major cities, and some local journalists went
567
See Mike Isaac, Why Everyone Is Angry at Facebook Over Its Political Ads
Policy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
22,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/technology/campaigns-pressurefacebook-political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/RX3G-9SP2].
568
See Dylan Byers, How Facebook and Twitter decided to take down Trump’s
accounts,
NBC
NEWS
(Jan.
14,
2021,
5:01
PM
EST),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/how-facebook-twitter-decidedtake-down-trump-s-accounts-n1254317 [https://perma.cc/8TZB-LDHB].
569
See Russell Brandom, These are the violent threats that made Amazon drop
Parler,
THE
VERGE
(Jan.
13,
2021,
10:17
AM
EST),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/13/22228675/amazon-parler-takedownviolent-threats-moderation-content-free-speech [https://perma.cc/P6RB-N5Z2].
570
See Jon Brodkin, Parler’s attempt to get back on Amazon Web Services rejected
by judge, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 21, 2021, 5:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2021/01/judge-rejects-parler-claim-that-amazon-must-reinstate-webhosting-service/ [https://perma.cc/4Z7R-9SK3].
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into hiding for fear that their reporting could compromise their
safety.”571 Similarly, one of the flashpoints in Hong Kong’s protests
was the use of social media to “galvanize support during a political
movement.”572 In fact, such social media posts led to arrests under
Hong Kong’s new national security law as inciting secession.573
Amnesty International has called out this conduct by the Chinese
government as fundamentally inconsistent with the right to free
expression, noting that “[i]nternational human rights laws do not
allow states to restrict all peaceful expression in the name of national
security.”574 This rationale obviously applies to arrests in the name
of national security.575 But it should also extend to access to cyber
connectivity and the ability to engage in peaceful expression in the
first place.
If such conduct by states is questionable because it limits
freedom of expression and connectivity, cyber-nuisance suggests
that it should similarly be problematic when it is perpetrated by
private apex actors. The correlative rights of cyber participants are
impaired by both, state action and private action. The cybernuisance logic, therefore, requires some limitation on the power of
apex platforms to shut out those with whom it disagrees.
Here, the currently unfolding reaction to the January 6 Capitol
riot will provide an early test case.576 The abatement strategy by
apex platforms to deprive certain kind of speech of a platform can
be justified.577 The Amnesty International critique of Chinese
571
See Hannah Beech, Myanmar’s Leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Is Detained
Amid
Coup,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
31,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/world/asia/myanmar-coup-aung-sansuu-kyi.html [https://perma.cc/L2GR-7663].
572
See Grace Shao, Social media has become a battleground in Hong Kong’s protests,
CNBC (Aug. 16, 2019, 5:41 PM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/16/socialmedia-has-become-a-battleground-in-hong-kongs-protests.html
[https://perma.cc/4ZAW-68L7].
573
See Amnesty Int’l, Hong Kong: National security arrests over social media posts
violate
freedom
of
expression
(July
30,
2020,
14:20
UTC),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-nationalsecurity-arrests-over-social-media-posts-violate-freedom-of-expression/
[https://perma.cc/K8JF-VQMM].
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Id.
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See Adam Satariano, After Barring Trump, Facebook and Twitter Face Scrutiny
About
Inaction
Abroad,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
14,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/technology/trump-facebooktwitter.html [https://perma.cc/V77A-B9HX].
577
Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1088

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:4

crackdowns in the name of national security here is instructive: is
the speech in question “peaceful expression?”578 Incitement to
violence certainly is not.579
The actions of apex platforms become increasingly problematic
if the platforms use their market power in the absence of such a
threat of violence. The Biden White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki
bluntly stated that the Biden White House does not miss President
Trump on Twitter.580 As that statement suggests, this inability is
beginning to affect political discourse. The line between policing
dangerous content and peaceful expression therefore appears
increasingly tenuous to hold.
Cyber-nuisance would therefore counsel that de-platforming is
an acceptable abatement only to a point. Once actionable threats of
violence have ceased, continuing to shut out cyber participants on
the basis of the content of their speech is problematic. In fact, deplatforming might even give rise to a cyber-nuisance in its own right
as it infringes on the correlative rights of a large number of peaceful
actors.581 How apex platforms strike this balance at the current time,
therefore, will be of particular importance to watch.
Radical though this change is, it does not give up the function of
cyber-nuisance as a principle of international law, that is, the law
between States. Cyber-nuisance as a principle of international law
does not bind non-State actors as such.582 Rather, cyber-nuisance as
a principle of international law requires States to communicate with
non-State actors under their jurisdiction to regulate in a manner
consistent with the correlative rights of other States and other nonState cyber participants.
But importantly, cyber-nuisance functions as more than just a
principle of international law. It also has a role to play in
transnational and domestic law. Thus, if the submission in this
Article is right, non-State actors are themselves subject to cyberSee Amnesty Int’l, supra note 573.
See Satariano, supra note 576.
580
See Jonathan Easley, Psaki: We don’t miss Trump on Twitter, THE HILL (Feb.
1, 2021, 01:29 PM EST), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/536783psaki-we-dont-miss-trump-on-twitter [https://perma.cc/4UR6-JWY9].
581
The argument that parties have consented to the power of apex platform
to use their market power in this way is the subject of a future article. As I will
argue, the one-sided fundamental alteration of the marketplace does not fall within
the scope of such consent, even if it is arguably included in the terms of use as its
deployment by apex platforms would not be in good faith.
582
See CRAWFORD 2014, supra note 96, at 221 (discussing the traditional scope
of application of international law).
578
579
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nuisance concerns as a holder of correlative rights and correlative
duties vis-à-vis other, similarly situated non-State actors. These
correlative rights and duties are part of the legal decision-making
process of these non-State actors as part of their own governance
environment.
This means that cyber sets up nestled governance processes that
all follow a similar logic of correlative rights as made actionable in
the nuisance context. States act in a regulatory and a sovereign
capacity as actors in cyber in their own right as guided by the Statebased public international law cyber-nuisance principle. Global
business transactions concerning cyber infrastructure are governed
by the transnational principle of cyber-nuisance as incorporated in
the lex digitalis. And the relationship between consumers or users of
cyber and private companies in turn is governed by correlative
rights principles as established in their domestic laws.
Each of these cyber-nuisance processes sits nestled in the other
as each can affect the other.583 An increase in cyber-diligence in the
transnational space will affect neighborhood conditions in the
international setting. International diligence obligations will change
the domestic regulatory space. The domestic regulatory space will
affect the transnational space and so on. Governance is thus truly
polycentric. Cyber-nuisance can bring all stakeholders to the table
to govern up.
This leaves the question of how a cyber-nuisance paradigm
would look at NotPetya.584 We already have the lion share of the
answer to this problem. To begin with, a cyber-nuisance paradigm
would flag that many actors failed to do their part to protect the
commons and thus, the correlative rights of other participants. The
development of EternalBlue by the NSA would raise a flag as the
program foreseeably could have been used to wreak precisely the
havoc that it did.585 The hack of EternalBlue and its dissemination
also would raise additional cyber-nuisance concerns.586 Leaving
aside the legality of the deployment of NotPetya in Ukraine itself,
the willingness to do collateral damage globally would be a further
concern.587 Finally, business would have a role to play—Windows

583
584
585
586
587

See OSTROM DIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 269-70.
See Greenberg, supra note 121.
See Greenberg, supra note 121.
See Greenberg, supra note 121.
See Greenberg, supra note 121.
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in dealing with a vulnerability and global business in protecting
critical infrastructure from cross-company contamination.588
In the case of NotPetya, cyber-nuisance would not be a good tool
to assign blame. Given the chain reaction needed to lead to
NotPetya, cyber-nuisance would be of reasonably little help in a
liability context. Maersk and consequently Denmark would have a
right to act against the Russian Federation if the NotPetya attack
could be attributed to the Russian Federation. But they likely would
have had such a right under Tallinn 2.0, in any event.589 The more
interesting question is whether Maersk and consequently Denmark
would have rights against the United States and Ukraine—rights
they would not have under Tallinn 2.0.590 While cyber-nuisance
provides a plausible articulation of how the United States and
Ukraine created conditions causing Maersk a substantial
impairment of its correlative rights in cyber, it is far from clear
whether such arguments would clear the hurdles of causation and
overcome Maersk’s own conduct and the relative reasons by the
United States and Ukraine, for their respective actions and
omissions would not ultimately speak against imposing liability on
a cyber-nuisance theory.
But the point of cyber-nuisance is precisely not to assign blame
but to assist in future decision-making.591 And here, cyber-nuisance
is both far more robust and far more consistent with the actual
regulatory response to NotPetya. It turns out that the United States
and its Department of Homeland Security has stepped up its
regulatory dialogue businesses to prevent similar vulnerabilities by
issuing guidelines and discussing their implementation with
businesses.592 Companies on their own are acting to harden their
own cyber defenses.593 In other words, actors are responding as
prudent correlative rights holders both to protect themselves and
the commons. Such collaborative action between States and
See Greenberg, supra note 121.
See Piret Pernik, Responding to “the Most Destructive and Costly Cyberattack
in History,” RKK-ICDS (Feb. 23, 2018), https://icds.ee/responding-to-the-mostdestructive-and-costly-cyberattack-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/JX7C-7HNP].
590
Id.
591
See REISMAN, supra note 152, at 183-90.
592
See NAT. GAS COUNCIL, DEFENSE IN DEPTH: CYBER-SECURITY IN THE NATURAL
GAS
&
OIL
INDUSTRY
(2018)
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Cybersecurity/2018/Defense-inDepth-Cybersecurity-in-the-Natural-Gas-and-Oil-Industry.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MK7E-TUHM].
593
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businesses increases neighborhood standards. This increase in
neighborhood standards in turn lays the predicate for future
appraisal of new threat scenarios—and it is perfectly consistent with
the decision by City of Frankfurt to shut down its IT department in
the face of an Emotet threat to avoid a cross-contamination.594
In other words, many actors are already engaging each other in
cyber in a manner that is consistent with the concept of correlative
rights and nuisance as developed in this Article. Cyber-nuisance
would provide a better rubric through which to understand this
conduct and guide it more quickly towards a better maintained,
more diffusively governed cyber commons.
The SolarWinds hack showcases why accelerating this process is
so important. SolarWinds has shown us both the promise and peril
of a cyberspace that is fundamentally co-operated by public and
private entities. On the side of peril, it was the lax security at a
globally operating apex cyber company that permitted the
spectacular hack to come off in the first place.595 It was the strategic
importance of this company to governmental infrastructure that
allowed the hack to elude early detection—and “exploit[] seams in
U.S. defenses.”596 Public and private cybersecurity, therefore, are
fused at the hip and must be treated as such to protect the commons.
But just as importantly—and here is the promise of the current
paradigm—it was a private company and not the government that
discovered the intrusion and began the process of analyzing the
breach.597 The fact that actors collaborate across the public/private
divide to secure the commons therefore is instrumental to hardening
cyber-defenses and securing greater access to the promise of cyber.
It is only when such cooperation intensifies that rogue actors (be
they state controlled, commercial, criminal, or in the grey between)
can be found out and the consequences of their conduct abated. In
other words, while there is a path, there is a long way yet to travel.
VI. CONCLUSION: CYBER-NUISANCE AND CYBER-GOVERNANCE
What are the consequences of cyber-nuisance for cybergovernance?
Cyber-nuisance has made several significant
594
595
596
597
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contributions to cyber governance. The first of these contributions,
while it may appear reasonably minor, is paradigm-shifting. Tallinn
2.0 rejected to treat cyber as a commons on the grounds that cyber is
subject to the jurisdiction of States and as such not communally
owned.598 The Article has shown that this is a significant
misunderstanding of commons and commons governance and
should lead the Tallinn 2.0 experts to rethink their conclusion.
Centrally, Tallinn 2.0 starts out from the principles of sovereignty
that each State shall be absolutely free to enjoy its own rights within
its sovereign jurisdiction and that each State may not unreasonably
interfere with the rights of States in their respective jurisdictions.599
This articulation of the starting point in Tallinn 2.0 is close to a
textbook Roman law understanding of property.600 It also mirrors
the understanding of otherwise apparently absolute property rights
in the common law.601
What this Article has shown is that commons form when these
absolute rights interact with each other to exploit a common pooled
resource and create correlative rights for its participants. In the
Roman law, this understanding gave rise to the actio negatoria.602 At
common law, it gave rise to the action of nuisance and later to a fully
fleshed understanding of correlative rights the protection of which
remains actionable in nuisance.603
The point that can hardly be overstressed is this: oil and gas
lessees have a property right in fee simple determinable in the
mineral estate.604 This right is in fee.605 This is similar to the
sovereign concern in Tallinn 2.0.606 The fact that oil and gas lessees
producing from a common formation are nevertheless acting in a
commons and are correlative rights holder in that commons should
put to the rest the notion that absolute ownership of a part defeats
the existence of a commons in a whole or correlative rights against
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 11.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 13, 16-17.
600
See Mellius De Villiers, Nuisances in Roman Law, 13 L.Q. REV. 387, 391 (1897).
601
See Pierce, supra note 36.
602
See PETIT, supra note 420, at 703-04.
603
See Pierce, supra note 36, at 259-64; Fraley, supra note 327, at 453-57.
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See Porter Wright, What is an Oil and Gas Lease?, OIL & GAS L. REP. (Sept. 27,
2013),
https://www.oilandgaslawreport.com/2013/09/27/what-is-an-oil-andgas-lease-a-federal-court-in-ohio-predicts-ohio-law/
[https://perma.cc/2E399LMP].
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other commons participants.607 And this is not a quirk of American
property law. It is the received wisdom of Justinian.608 Moreover, it
is consistent with legal traditions as diverse as shari’a, the mixed
jurisdiction of Israel, and the People’s Republic of China.609
This alone requires a fundamental rethinking of Tallinn 2.0. It
completely misses from view that commons create correlative
rights.610 A legal decision-making toolkit operating in a commons
that does not account for correlative rights is flawed and
significantly under-protects the rights of participants in the
commons. Not only that, but it also threatens the very infrastructure
Tallinn 2.0 seeks to protect. As property (sovereignty) matters to
Tallinn 2.0, so should the commons.
Importantly, Tallinn 2.0 hints at the critical importance of such a
commons understanding of cyber when it imports the core diligence
norm from international environmental law.611
It just
misunderstands it.
The diligence norm in international
environmental law developed in jurisprudence from Trail Smelter
onwards is a nuisance norm to protect U.S. communities against
cross-boundary air pollution from Canadian smokestacks.612 It
imports precisely the commons concerns Tallinn 2.0 rejects.613
Tallinn 2.0, in other words, mistranslates the general
international law it wishes to import into cyber. Cyber-nuisance sets
out how a more faithful translation would change the landscape of
cyber governance in the mold of Tallinn 2.0. Such a translation
would allow for a more networked approach to cyber-security. It
further would provide a means to move away from a view of cyber
as the new battlefield and towards an understanding of cyber as a
space of correlative rights and cooperative collaboration.
This focus on correlative rights can also banish the threat of
spiraling countermeasures wreaking further destruction on cyber.
The avowed reason to set a high threshold for diligence obligations
was to avoid a scenario in which States impose ever harsher
countermeasures on each other for a failure to keep their diligence
See Pierce, supra note 36.
See De Villiers, supra note 600, at 391.
609
See infra Section V.B.
610
See Pierce, supra note 36.
611
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 22, at 35.
612
See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), III UNRIAA 1905, 1925 (Apr. 16,
1938 & Mar. 11, 1941); see also PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 25, 254 (4th ed. 2018).
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obligations. This reason makes sense in a responsibility paradigm.
It is out of place in a correlative right paradigm.
Cyber-nuisance has shown that the appropriate remedy for the
substantial impairment of correlative rights is abatement.614 Selfhelp or countermeasures therefore in the first instance are also
limited to actions in abatement, that is, actions that remove the
specific cyber threat.615 This limitation already excludes the tit-fortat of spiraling countermeasures.616 To constitute permissible selfhelp, the nuisance paradigm requires that each countermeasure be
specifically tailored to abate the nuisance.
This still leaves significant room for cyber operations, including
offensive cyber operations. A State that stands to suffer particular
harm (in other words, would have standing to sue for a private
nuisance) may take countermeasures to seek out and destroy cyber
capabilities of States and non-State actors alike to the extent that
those cyber capabilities demonstrably and substantially threaten its
correlative rights to enjoy the cyber commons. To do so, it must
warn the relevant actors to give them an opportunity to abate the
nuisance themselves, consistent with existing countermeasure
principles.617 If the warning goes unheeded, the State could then act
to protect the cyber infrastructure.618 But to act in such defense of
the commons in logic would also require the State to forswear the
development and deployment of similar capabilities to those being
sought and destroyed. Estoppel would require as much.619
To the extent that such measures cannot be taken directly,
indirect countermeasures may still be permissible in very limited
circumstances. Specifically, if any attempt at abatement would itself
harm the cyber commons, this would preclude the use of those
countermeasures. Then, other measures may well be necessary to
bring about abatement. Even then, however, the logic of the regime
set out in this Article suggests that any actions may not themselves
create a cyber-nuisance. And any such actions must be preceded by
appropriate offers of assistance to abate the cyber nuisance
proportionate to the countermeasures about to be undertaken to
614
See Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610; TUNC, supra note 381, at 56; Barak, supra
note 478, at 694 (discussing Ata Textiles Co., (1976) 30(iii) P.D. 785 (Isr.)).
615
See Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 610; CHENG, supra note 282, at 97-100.
616
See Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1563-64.
617
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 135.
618
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 135.
619
See CHENG, supra note 282, at 143-44.
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comply with the requirement to warn as adapted to its new
environment.620
This remedial consequence of the cyber-nuisance paradigm
allows one to have both greater diligence and less chaos from
sprawling cyber countermeasures.621 It again makes States and
other participants in cyber accountable to each other for the
conservation of their commons. At worst, the remedial consequence
of excessive self-help would lead to excessive conservation. This
result is broadly consistent with the correlative rights rationale to
put sustainability of use for all above the interests of use of each.622
It is therefore not an unintended consequence or crude destabilizer
of the commons.
Finally, cyber-nuisance also begins to provide the clues to
answer that has vexed the discussion from the other, private law
side. As discussed in the previous section, transnational lawyers
previously insisted upon the existence of a transnational lex
digitalis.623 This insistence upon a lex digitalis was premised upon the
idea that cyberspace is beyond the jurisdiction of a States to
regulate—that it is a communally owned space in needed of truly
stateless regulation.624
Cyber-nuisance has suggested that this insistence is just as
wrong as the insistence by Tallinn 2.0 that cyber is not a commons.
The lex digitalis went too far in completely unmooring cyber from
the underlying jurisdictional ties that bind it to the brick-and-mortar
world. It turns out that it may have done so on the basis of the same
misunderstanding as Tallinn 2.0, but in reverse, namely on the basis
of the assumption that a commons must be a fully communally
owned space.625 As the comparative property law analysis in this
Article has shown, this premise is simply false. Commons can exist
between and across distinct and parceled out claims of ownership—
or in the sovereign context, jurisdiction. What makes such commons
interesting is that the relative ownership claims strengthen rather
than weaken the correlative rights involved. It provides a stronger
anchor for the holding of correlative rights and thus provides a more
ILC Articles, supra note 57, at 135.
See Jensen & Watts, supra note 26, at 1563-64 (raising the countermeasures
threat as a reason against increased diligence requirements).
622
See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 108-42.
623
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624
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interesting conception of commons governance in a co-owned
relationship between separately owned spaces.
This understanding is likely to provide a more interesting
intersect between the State-based world of Tallinn 2.0 and the
stateless world of the lex digitalis. Cyber-nuisance thus can function
as a bridge between normative orders that can doubtless enrich each
other through the understanding of the respective “other half” they
currently miss.
Cyber-nuisance finally reinvigorates the etymological pull of
cyber. The κυβερνάτας of a Greek vessel was its steersman or
guide.626 Steering a vessel is not a question of land or open sea. It
requires both. This was anchored in the very soul of the seafaring
Athenian. Just ask an Athenian about their founding myths and
they would tell you their ancestors were sprung from the land of
Attica itself, autochthones.627 The greatest seafarers of the ancient
West—the greatest steersmen—were thus earthborn and seaborne
alike. Land and sea, land and commons, were no contradiction—
they were part of the same identity. Cyber, and correlative rights in
cyber, reflect the same experience 3,400 years hence.

626
Κυβερνήτης,
MIDDLE
LIDDELL
LEXICON,
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=kuberna%2Ftas&la=greek&can
=kuberna%2Ftas0&prior=kube/rnasis#lexicon [https://perma.cc/UDD9-TLVP].
For a fuller discussion of the historical root and usage of the term and how it came
to be associated with cyberspace, see The Vocabularist: How We Use the Word Cyber,
BBC
(Mar.
15, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35765276
[https://perma.cc/926Z-LT6S]. For a further interesting etymological link from
Κυβερνήτης to the English governor, see James William Johnson, “Reverend Shapes:”
Lord Rochester’s Many Mentors, in MENTORING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH
LITERATURE AND CULTURe 17, 17 (Anthony W. Lee ed., 2010).
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